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Abstract
This paper revisits the problem of adverse selection in the insurance market of Rothschild and
Stiglitz [28]. We propose a simple extension of the game-theoretic structure in Hellwig [14] under
which Nash-type strategic interaction between the informed customers and the uninformed firms
results always in a particular separating equilibrium. The equilibrium allocation is unique and
Pareto-efficient in the interim sense subject to incentive-compatibility and individual rationality.
In fact, it is the unique neutral optimum in the sense of Myerson [22].
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1 Introduction
This paper readdresses an old but still open question in applied micro-economic theory: how a
competitive market will allocate insurance policies when firms cannot distinguish amongst the
different risk-classes of customers. To this end, it restricts attention to the simplest depiction that
captures the essential features of this question, an economy in which each of a continuum of agents
observes a binary parameter indicating the probability of suffering an income loss. For this version
of the problem, we propose a game-theoretic structure under which Nash-type strategic interaction
between the informed insurees and uninformed insurers delivers the strongest of results. The
equilibrium is unique and sorts the two types by maximizing the welfare of the low-risk agents. More
importantly, it does so in a way that renders the equilibrium outcome interim incentive efficient
(i.e, Pareto-efficient in the interim sense and subject to incentive-compatibility and individual
rationality). In fact, and in a sense to be made precise below, it is the most desirable allocation on
the interim incentive efficient (IIE) frontier.
Needless to say, we examine the interactions between the market participants under the lenses
of non-cooperative game-theory. This has become the standard tool for analyzing markets with
adverse selection because of its main virtue, every detail of the economic environment is made
explicit. Indeed, a well-defined extensive-form game with incomplete information describes all the
institutional details of the market, the information that is available to each of the players and the
actions they may take. With respect to studying markets for insurance provision, this approach
was first adopted by Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. Yet, the main implication of their study (as well
as of the subsequent generalization by Riley [27]) was that, abstracting away from specific market
structures but viewing market participants as engaging in Nash-type strategic behavior, adverse
selection can be too cumbersome for competitive markets to function, even under the simplest of
settings. It limits the form of contractual arrangements that are consistent with equilibrium, to
the extent that it can even preclude its existence altogether.
Specifically, under Nash-type strategic behavior (it is common knowledge amongst all players
that no player can influence the actions of any other player), there might be no (pooling) equilibrium
arrangement offering a single price per unit of coverage. This occurs when insurance firms have an
incentive to charge higher prices for greater coverage because, by doing so, they are able to sort
their lower-risk customers from the higher-risk ones (for whom additional coverage yields greater
marginal benefits). In this case, the only possible contractual arrangement is separating with
each risk-class paying its own premium, equal to its true accident probability. Unfortunately, the
Rothchild-Stiglitz (RS) allocation is a viable equilibrium only under limiting conditions.
This alarming observation led to the emergence of a significant body of literature whose prin-
cipal aim has been to propose allocation mechanisms, along with implementing market structures,
which ensure that always some allocation will be supported as competitive equilibrium, under some
associated notion of equilibrium. The respective models can be broadly classified into three sets,
based upon the extent to which the mechanism allows the players’ behavior to be strategic. All
but two, however, share an unsatisfactory feature: whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, the same
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is almost always true also for the suggested equilibria. The two exemptions are Miyazaki [21]
and Bisin and Gottardi [2] but either suffers from deficiencies regarding the implementation of the
proposed equilibrium.
One class of models has focused on Walrasian mechanisms. In its purest form, this approach was
initiated by Prescott and Townsend [25]-[26] and revisited recently by Rustichini and Siconolfi [29].
The central message of these papers is that general economies with adverse selection do not always
admit pure Walrasian equilibrium pricing systems and, when they do, the resulting allocations are
not necessarily IIE. To guarantee existence, some studies have introduced rationing (Gale [10]-[11],
Guerrieri et al. [13]) or suppressed the requirement that firms are profit-maximizing, imposing at
the same time quantity constraints on trade (Dubey and Geanakoplos [5], Dubey et al. [6]).
Either of these approaches arrives at some equilibrium that is essentially unique and involves
a separating allocation. Typically, however, this is not IIE while uniqueness obtains by restricting
the out-of-equilibrium actions and beliefs often in strong ways. Under rationing, the refinement
criteria range from subgame perfection (Guerrieri et al. [13]) to the Universal Divinity of Banks
and Sobel [1] (Gale [10]) or the Stability of Kohlberg and Mertens [16] (Gale [11]). The latter
notion has been deployed also under quantity constraints (Dubey and Geanakoplos [5], Dubey et
al. [6]) but seems to be more binding in that environment. As shown in Martin [18], its weakening
to something akin to trembling-hand perfection allows for many pooling equilibria which typically
Pareto-dominate the separating allocation but are not IIE either.
Instead of constraining the Walrasian mechanism, Bisin and Gottardi [2] enhance it with the
implicit presence of institutions that monitor trade appropriately. Restricting attention to the
same insurance economy as the one in he present paper, they show that the RS allocation obtains
always as the unique Walrasian equilibrium if there are markets for contingent claims in which
agents trade only incentive-compatible contracts. To ensure that incentive efficiency is attained
whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, they introduce also markets for consumption rights. The
ensuing Arrow-Lindahl equilibria internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection.
In fact, by varying the endowment of consumption rights, the authors are able to trace the entire
IIE frontier but for one point. The latter, which is no other than the unique equilibrium allocation
in the present paper, can be obtained only as the limit of a sequence of equilibria.
Another perspective has been to look at mechanisms in which competitive equilibrium is sup-
ported by strategic behavior. This has produced two separate lines of approach. In earlier models,
some of the players exhibit strategic behavior which is not of the Nash-type. Specifically, the sellers
in Wilson [31], Riley [27], Engers and Fernandez [8], and Miyazaki [21] but also the buyers in Gross-
man [12] are able to foresee the unraveling of equilibrium Rothschild and Stiglitz warned about and
modify their plans so as to prevent it. By contrast, most later studies have been built upon the
game-theoretical foundation in Hellwig [14] or its generalization in Maskin and Tirole [19]. Under
these structures, whenever the RS allocation is not IIE, a multiplicity of contractual arrangements
can be supported as sequential equilibria. Within the richness of the resulting equilibrium set,
however, the IIE subset is of negligible size.
Evidently, even though there are by now many views about how a competitive market might
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allocate insurance policies under adverse selection, a crucial question has been left open: whether,
if at all, and under which game-theoretic structure a competitive market whose participants engage
in Nash-type strategic behavior may ensure that resources are allocated efficiently. This motivates
the present paper which answers this question in the affirmative, and in the strongest sense, using
structural elements that are well-known in the literature. Our main message is that a simple
extension of Hellwig’s game-structure delivers always and uniquely a particular efficient allocation
as Nash equilibrium.
As we argue in the sequel, the analysis of Rothschild and Stiglitz can be interpreted by means
of a two-stage game in which, at stage 1, the firms make binding offers of insurance contracts
while, at stage 2, the customers choose amongst them. By contrast, Hellwig turns the offers firms
make at stage 1 non-binding by adding a third stage in which, after observing the other firms’
contractual offers at stage 1 and the customers’ choices at stage 2, a firm may withdraw any of its
own contracts. Regarding this game, we envision expanding the strategy space of the insurance
providers along two dimensions. Our firms may subsidize their net income across contracts by
offering menus of them at stage 1. They can also publicly pre-commit, if they so wish, to an offer
on either of two levels: not withdrawing a contract at stage 3, irrespectively of the history of play
at that point (commitment on the contractual level), or not withdrawing an element of a menu
unless they withdraw the menu itself (commitment on the policy level).
Under this structural enhancement, the IIE allocation that maximizes the welfare of low-risk
customers can always be supported as the unique equilibrium, for a given distribution of the two
risk-types in the population, even when one does not exist in the Rothschild-Stiglitz setting. The
equilibrium outcome coincides with the RS allocation when the latter is IIE. Otherwise, it involves
cross-subsidization across risk-classes but also contracts. Each class pays a different risk premium,
the one paid by the high-risk (low-risk) agents being less (more) than their true accident probability.
As a result, insurers expect losses on their high-risk customers to be offset by profits from the low-
risk ones.
In fact, our equilibrium allocation is the one suggested by Miyasaki who was the first to allow
suppliers to offer menus rather than single contracts. His focus, however, was on adverse selection
in the labor market and he chose to identify a firm with its wage-structure, its menu of wage-effort
contracts. As a result, he viewed free entry and exit in the labor market as dictating that a firm
may withdraw its menu but not only a single contract from that menu. This restriction, which is
fundamental for Miyasaki’s analysis, was heavily criticized in the realm of insurance markets by
Grossman. This author pointed out that insurance suppliers more often than not require buyers
to submit applications. That is, they may indeed offer menus of contracts but are also able to
withdraw specific contracts from these menus by simply rejecting the corresponding applications.
Allowing firms to do so, Grossman concluded that the equilibrium contractual arrangement ought
to entail pooling, unless it is the RS allocation.
We do take into account this insight but also another equally realistic element of insurance
suppliers’ behavior: they often choose to send certain customers “pre-approved” applications. As
long as it is public belief that the latter term is binding in an enforceable manner, the two elements
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together permit an insurance supplier not only to withdraw a particular contract from a menu at
stage 3, but also to publicly-commit, at stage 1, to not withdraw it. As it turns out, endogenizing
in this way the commitment of firms upon their insurance promises restricts dramatically the
equilibrium set. In conjunction with endogenous commitment on the policy level, it delivers always
the same singleton one. As it happens, on the one hand, commitment on the contractual level is not
observed in equilibrium. “Pre-approved” applications are deployed only off the equilibrium path to
restrict the players’ beliefs so that the many equilibria in the standard version of Hellwig’s game
are ruled out. On the other, the equilibrium insurance menu is introduced under commitment on
the policy level.
Needless to say, it is not simply the interaction between menus and Hellwig’s game that drives
our result. Cross-subsidization of net income between contracts has been considered also by Maskin
and Tirole [19] under a game-theoretic structure similar to Hellwig’s but a much more general
interpretation of contractual arrangements. This paper identified the set of equilibrium allocations
that would emerge if the latter are actually mechanisms: specifications of a game-form to be played
between two parties, the set of possible actions for each, and an allocation for each pair of strategies.
Even though the authors’ main focus was on signalling, they established that the set of equilibrium
outcomes remains essentially the same under screening as long as the out-of-equilibrium actions
and beliefs are left unrestricted. Much in agrement with Hellwig’s intuition, this set is rich to an
extent that renders its IIE subset negligible.
By comparison, the present paper demonstrates the necessity of restricting the market par-
ticipants’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs in order to arrive at the given IIE outcome. Our augmented
version of Hellwig’s game is an example of a mechanism that restricts the out-of-equilibrium beliefs
appropriately. It does so by relying heavily on the notion of endogenous commitment and, in this
sense, attests to the important role of what are called public actions in Myerson [22]. These are
enforceable decisions individual players can publicly-commit themselves to carry out, even if they
may turn out ex-post to be harmful to themselves or others. Myerson assigns to the set of public
actions center-stage in establishing the existence of neutral optima. The latter form the smallest
class of incentive-compatible allocations that are attainable as sequential equilibria of the game in
which the informed party proposes mechanisms and satisfy four fundamental axioms of mechanism
selection. As we argue in the sequel, our equilibrium allocation is the unique neutral optimum for
the insurance economy under study.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the market for insurance
provision in the context of Hellwig’s three-stage game. It revisits important results which are
commonly-used in applications of Hellwig’s model but have been shown rather heuristically in the
literature. In particular, we identify their strategic underpinnings and show how, viewed under the
light of contractual commitment, they set the stage for our main result. This is presented in Section
3 which analyzes how the interplay between commitment on the contractual and policy levels leads
in fact to efficient insurance provision. In Section 4, we discuss and interpret our findings further,
in particular vis a vis relevant ones in the literature. Section 5 concludes. It is followed by an
Appendix containing the analytical version of our arguments. By contrast, wherever possible, the
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main text presents the economic intuition behind our claims via graphical examples of cases in
which they are true.
2 The Simple Model Revisited
To parsimoniously describe adverse selection in the market for insurance provision, imagine that,
after having inferred as much as possible from observable characteristics, the insurance firms have
grouped a continuum of customers into two classes of otherwise identical individuals.1 Across these,
the agents differ only in the probability of having an accident, which is known by no one else but
the agent herself. For the low-risk class, which contains a fraction λ ∈ (0, 1) of the population,
this probability is pL. The high-risk class includes the remainder of individuals whose accident
probability is pH , with 0 < pL < pH < 1.
Each individual is endowed with wealth W ∈ R++, to be reduced by the amount d ∈ (0,W )
if she suffers an accident. She may insure herself against this event by accepting an insurance
contract a = (a0, a1) ∈ R
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+. That is, by paying a premium a0 if no accident occurs (state s = 0)
in exchange for receiving the net indemnity a1 otherwise (state s = 1). Having entered this
agreement with an insurance supplier, her state-contingent wealth is given uniquely by the vector
w = (w0, w1) = (W − a0,W − d+ a1), a transfer of wealth across states at the premium rate
dw1
dw0
= −da0da1 . Her preferences over such vectors (equivalently, over the respective contracts) admit
an expected utility representation with an identical for all consumers, strictly-increasing, strictly-
concave, twice continuously-differentiable Bernoulli utility function u : R++ 7→ R. For an agent
of risk-type h ∈ {L,H}, the preference relation will be denoted by %h, its representation being
Uh (w) = (1− ph)u (w0) + phu (w1).
On the supply side of the market, insurance is provided by risk-neutral firms which maximize
expected profits: Πp (a) = (1− p) a0− pa1, when the typical insurance contract is sold to a pool of
customers whose average accident probability is p ∈ [0, 1]. It will be convenient to use the particular
notation Πh (·) and ΠM (·) whenever this probability is, respectively, ph or the population average,
p = λpL + (1− λ) pH . These firms are supposed to have adequate financial resources to be willing
and able to supply any number of insurance contracts they think profitable.
In fact, they may supply any collection of contracts that is expected to deliver aggregate profits,
even if some of its members might be loss-making in expectation. As will be apparent in the sequel,
in the market under study, the relevant collections of this kind are binary and will be referred to
henceforth as insurance menus. Unless otherwise stated, the typical one {aL,aH} is separating
(the subscript indicating the respective risk-class the contract is meant for) with single contracts
corresponding to trivial menus {a,a}. The latter will be referred to as pooling policies if meant to
be bought by customers of either risk-class.2 Needless to say, designing insurance provision in this
1The continuum hypothesis is standard in models of this type. It allows us to invoke the strong law of large
numbers and claim that an insurance supplier whose policy will serve both types of customers can expect, with
virtual certainty, the composition of risk-types in its client pool to be identical to that in the population.
2Formally (see Step 5 of our RSW analysis in the Appendix), the distinction between pooling policies and sepa-
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way entails the usual incentive-compatibility and individual-rationality constraints:
Uh (wh)− Uh (wh′) ≥ 0 (1)
Uh (w) ≥ uh ≡ Uh (W,W − d) h, h
′ ∈ {L,H} (2)
The insurance market is taken to be competitive in that there is free entry and exit. In equi-
librium, therefore, we may observe only menus that expect at least zero aggregate profits. As a
consequence, with respect to pooling policies, the admissible space consists of contracts a ∈ R2+
that satisfy
Uh (w) ≥ uh h, h
′ ∈ {L,H}
ΠM (a) ≥ 0
Moreover, any menu may be supplied if expected to be demanded (i.e. at least one of its contracts is
expected to be bought given that customers choose insurance contracts to maximize their expected
utility) and profitable. The workings of this market will be modeled by means of the three-stage
game in Hellwig [14]. At stage 1, the insurance companies offer menus of contracts. At stage 2,
customers choose contracts from these menus to apply for, each being allowed to apply for only
one contract. At stage 3, the firms may reject whatever applications they have received at stage 2.
To make predictions, we will use the notion of sequential (equivalently, with only two risk-types,
perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. We seek that is a vector of strategies - one for the firms and one for
each type of customer - and a vector of beliefs - at each information set in the game tree - such that
the strategies are optimal at each point (sequential rationality) given that the beliefs are (fully)
consistent. Under this notion and using the terms “honoring” (or “not withdrawing”) a contract
to mean that none of its applications is rejected at stage 3, an equilibrium insurance menu is such
that (a) in equilibrium, each of its constituent contracts is honored at stage 3 and chosen by at least
one risk-class of customers, and (b) there is no other admissible menu that, if offered alongside the
one in question, would expect strictly positive profits.
Even though by now standard in the pertinent literature, this definition hinges upon the market
participants’ beliefs about the profitability of insurance menus. And these beliefs are unambiguous
only under full information, in which case the equilibrium set is a singleton, the strictly-separating
menu
{
aFL ,a
F
H
}
where aFh maximizes the expected utility of risk-type h amongst the contracts
that break even when demanded exclusively by this type.3 Otherwise, under adverse selection,
these beliefs depend fundamentally upon two defining features of the model: the type of separating
rating menus is that the latter entail at least one strict inequality in (1). If both inequalities bind, the menu will be
referred to as strictly separating.
3Let FOkp =
{
a ∈ R2+ : Πp (a) = k
}
be the level set of expected profits for some pair (p, k) ∈ [0, 1] × R+. In the
(a0, a1)-space, this is a line of slope
da1
da0
= − 1−p
p
with k = 0 defining that through the trivial contract a = 0, the
endowment point (W,W − d) in the (w0, w1)-space. When the accident probability in question is, respectively, ph
or p, the latter line will be referred to as the fair-odds line of risk-type h (FO∗h) or of the market (FO
∗
M ). In the
(w0, w1)-space, a
F
h = argmaxa∈R2
+
:Πh(a)≥0
Uh (w) corresponds to the point of tangency between the indifference curve
of risk-type h and the line FO∗h. This coincides with the intersection of the latter with the 45-degree line, the locus
of full-insurance
{
w ∈ R2++ : w0 = w1
}
.
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menus it admits and the strategies under which insurance policies are marketed. In what follows,
we investigate this relation and its implications when all players’ strategies are of the Nash-type.
2.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz Equilibrium
Suppose for now that, at stage 1 of the game described above, we admit only menus that (i) do
not involve cross-subsidization, and (ii) constitute binding contractual offers. Formally, the first
requirement restricts the admissible set to menus {aL,aH} ∈ R
4
+ that satisfy (1)-(2) and
Πh (ah) ≥ 0 h ∈ {H,L} (3)
The second requirement, on the other hand, renders common knowledge that being called upon to
act at stage 1 comes with an irreversible commitment to the action chosen at that point. Specifically,
no part of an insurance menu may be withdrawn at stage 3, irrespective of the risk-class composition
of the pool of customers who chose it at stage 2. This is an exogenous restriction which renders the
third stage of Hellwig’s game obsolete. It reduces it to a two-stage game in which, at stage 1, the
uninformed insurance providers make contractual offers while, at stage 2, the informed customers
choose amongst them.4
It is easy to see that this version of the game leads to exactly the same equilibrium outcome as
the analysis in Rothschild and Stiglitz [28]. First of all, the RSW allocation is the only equilibrium
candidate allocation, as the following two results show formally. To see intuitively first why it
is not possible to have pooling policies in the equilibrium set, notice that a hypothetical pooling
equilibrium policy a∗ ought to just break-even in expectation. To do so, however, it must involve
cross-subsidization, expecting losses on the high-risk customers to be matched exactly by expected
profits from the low-risk ones.5 Yet, the very fact that strictly positive profits are extracted by the
low-risk type allows for the existence of another contract a1L which delivers strictly positive profits
if accepted only by low-risk agents and is such that a1L ≻L a
∗ ≻H a
1
L. This is shown formally by
Proposition 1 and graphically by any point in the interior of the shaded areas in Figures 1-2. In
the presence of a∗, therefore, a1L will attract away only the low-risk customers. Clearly, offering it
at stage 1 is a strictly-profitable deviation given that the pooling policy is also on offer.
Proposition 1 Let a be admissible as a pooling policy. Then, it cannot be sustained as an equilib-
rium allocation in the two-stage game described above.
4In terms of interpreting the third stage of our game by means of Grossman’s insight, insurance contracts here can
be introduced in the market only via sending out “pre-approved” application forms. Recall that we take the term to
mean that it is common knowledge amongst all market participants that any customer who files such an application
is guaranteed, in a way that is enforceable whatever her risk-type, delivery of the respective contract.
5Given free entry, we ought to have ΠM (a
∗) ≥ 0. Yet, this cannot be a strict inequality. For if ΠM (a
∗) = ǫ > 0,
we may consider the contract aˆ = a∗ − (1,−1) ǫ
2
which is such that aˆ ≻h a
∗ by either h (it provides strictly more
income in either state of the world). In the contingency, therefore, in which a∗ and aˆ are the only policies on offer, the
latter contract would attract the entire population of customers and, as a pooling policy itself, would expect profits
ΠM (aˆ) = ΠM (a
∗)− ǫ
2
> 0. It constitutes, that is, a profitable deviation, contradicting part (b) of the definition for
a
∗ to be a market equilibrium. To arrive at the claim in the text, notice that pH > pL requires ΠH (a
∗) < ΠL (a
∗).
Clearly, ΠM (a
∗) = 0 only if ΠH (a
∗) < 0 < ΠL (a
∗).
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Proof. See Appendix C.
Figure 1: Deviations against pooling policies
Figure 2: Deviations against pooling policies
An equilibrium policy, therefore, cannot be but a separating menu. Amongst the admissible
ones, though, the only legitimate candidate is what will be henceforth referred to as the Rothschild-
Stiglitz (RS) menu and denoted by {a∗∗L ,a
∗∗
H }. Its corresponding income allocation {w
∗∗
L ,w
∗∗
H }, the
so called Rothschild-Stiglitz-Wilson (RSW) allocation, solves the problem
max
(wL,wH)∈R
4
++
Uh (wh) s.t. (1), (2), (3) h ∈ {L,H}
This is the definition of an RSW allocation relative to zero reservation profits, as it appears in
Maskin and Tirole [19]. However, for the economy under study here, it can be identified also as
the solution to the more general problem
P1 (µ) : max
(aL,aH)∈A×A
µUL (aL) + (1− µ)UH (aH) s.t. (1), (2), and (3)
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where µ ∈ [0, 1]. In what follows the RSW allocation will be denoted by the menu {a∗∗L ,a
∗∗
H }, which
is identified in the following result.
Proposition 2 For any µ ∈ (0, 1], the solution to P1(µ) is uniquely the menu {a∗∗L ,a
∗∗
H } given by
the following conditions
(i) a∗∗H = a
FB
H ,
(ii) ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) = 0, and
(iii) UH (a
∗∗
L ) = UH
(
aFBH
)
.
This menu solves also the PI(0) problem although so does any incentive compatible menu {aL,a
∗∗
H }
such that UL (aL) ≥ uL and ΠL (aL) ≥ 0.
Proof. See Appendix B.
The RSW allocation plays an important in any competitive market environment with adverse
selection because it is the only feasible allocation that maximizes the utility of either risk-type while
being also ex-post individually rational. In the terminology of Myerson [22], it is a safe allocation,
one which would remain feasible even if the firm (the uninformed party) knew the agents’ type (the
private information of the informed party).
Proposition 3 Let aL,aH be separating (aL %L aH %H aL with at least one relation strict). If
(aL,aH) 6= (a
∗∗
L ,a
∗∗
H ), then it cannot be sustained as an equilibrium allocation in the two-stage game
described above.
Proof. See Appendix C.
To see intuitively why no other separating menu can be an equilibrium, suppose otherwise and
let {aL,aH} 6= {a
∗∗
L ,a
∗∗
H } be one. Observe also that the RSW allocation is unique and maximizes
the welfare of the high-risk agents amongst all the separating allocations that are admissible here.
It can only be, therefore, a∗∗H ≻H aH . As shown by Proposition 3, this necessitates the existence
of another contract a2L such that a
2
L ≻L aL,a
∗∗
H but a
∗∗
H ≻H a
2
L and which delivers strictly-positive
profits if chosen only by low-risk agents. Consider now a firm offering the menu
{
a2L,a
∗∗
H
}
. This
is separating and attracts either risk-type away from {aL,aH}. Doing so, moreover, it breaks-even
on the high-risk agents but is strictly profitable on the low-risk ones. Examples of a2L are given by
the interior points of the shaded area in either diagram of Figure 3.
Clearly, the RSW menu is the unique equilibrium candidate. Yet, there can be parameter
values for which even this is not a viable equilibrium. As Rothchild and Stiglitz pointed out, albeit
heuristically, this is bound to happen when there are enough low-risk agents in the population so
that the market fair-odds line FO∗M cuts through the low-risk indifference curve associated with
a∗∗L . Formally, the RSW menu is an equilibrium here if and only if there exists no contract the
low-risk type prefers strictly to a∗∗L and which delivers zero profits as pooling policy.
9
Figure 3: Deviations against a non-RS separating menu
Proposition 4 Let {a∗∗L ,a
∗∗
H } be the RSW allocation. It is an equilibrium allocation in the two-
stage game described above if and only if
6 ∃a ∈ R2+ : ΠM (a) = 0 and a ≻L a
∗∗
L
Proof. See Appendix C.
The contrapositive of the “only if” part of this statement is established by showing that, if
there are contracts that expect zero profits as pooling policies and are strictly preferred to a∗∗L
by the low-risk type, we can construct profitable deviations against the RSW menu. These are
contracts a2 that are strictly profitable as pooling policies and attract at least the low-risk type
away (a2 ≻L a
∗∗
L ). Obviously, if they pull away also the high-risk agents (a
2 ≻H a
∗∗
H ), they are
strictly profitable pooling deviations. Otherwise, the high-risk type opts to leave a2 with only the
low-risk agents and, hence, at least as large profits as before (recall the one before the last footnote).
Examples of the former case are points in the interior of the shaded area in Figure 4.
2.2 When in doubt, withdraw...
Suppose now that, in the game we just analyzed, the admissibility condition (ii) is altered so as
to allow only non-binding contractual offers.6 This re-enacts the third stage of the original game
by rendering two important elements common knowledge. Being called upon to act now at stage 1
caries no commitment to the action chosen at that point. Indeed, a firm will have to decide whether
or not to withdraw any part of its current offer at stage 3. It will make that decision, moreover,
after having observed the actions of all other firms at stage 1 and after having tried to infer the
subsequent choices of all customers at stage 2.
6To relate the description once again to Grossman’s interpretation of withdrawals, no firm has any “pre-approved”
application form at its disposal now. It is common knowledge amongst all market participants that no customer who
files an application may be guaranteed delivery of the respective contract.
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Figure 4: Deviations against the RS menu
To analyze what we will be calling henceforth the standard three-stage game, observe first that
the same argument as before precludes any admissible separating menu, but the RS one, from being
an equilibrium. The deviant strategy consists now of offering the menu
{
a2L,a
∗∗
H
}
at the first stage
with the intention to honor it at the third, irrespective of the history of play at that point. Being
strictly-separating with ΠL
(
a2L
)
> 0 = ΠH (a
∗∗
H ), the menu guarantees at least zero profits in any
possible contingency. And along the subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2 and in which
this and the original menu are the only ones that have been introduced at stage 1, the former
expects strictly-positive profits irrespectively of whether or not the latter is withdrawn at stage 3.
Regarding the admissible pooling policies, reasoning similarly as in the previous version of the
game, we conclude that only contracts a ∈ FO∗M are legitimate candidates.
7 And from these,
only the ones leaving the low-risk agents at least as well-off as a∗∗L . This is because, given any
a ∈ FO∗M : a
∗∗
L ≻L a, there are contracts a
4
L which are strictly-profitable if selected only by low-
risk agents and such that a∗∗H ≻H a
4
L ≻L a,a
∗∗
H (see the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram
of Figure 5).8 Consider then the strategy of offering
{
a4L,a
∗∗
H
}
at stage 1 in order to honor it
at stage 3, irrespective of the history of play at that point. Being strictly-separating, this menu
guarantees at least zero profits in any possible contingency. And in the event in which itself and the
7A similar argument to that in footnote 5 applies also here. The deviant strategy now offers aˆ at stage 1 as
a pooling policy. Along the subgame that starts at the beginning of stage 2 and in which aˆ and a∗ are the only
policies that have been introduced at stage 1, the deviant plan is to honor the former contract at stage 3. In this
contingency, the deviant firm expects strictly-positive profits irrespectively of whether or not a∗ gets withdrawn. In
any other subgame, the deviant plan is to withdraw aˆ at stage 3 if and only if some contract a ∈ R2+ : a ≻L aˆ has
been introduced at stage 1. Needless to say, in this event, neither a∗ can be honored.
8
a
4
L is constructed in the same way as aL in Case I in the proof of Proposition 5, once a
0
L is replaced by a
∗∗
L .
This gives a∗∗L ≻h a
4
L for either risk-type. Hence, a
∗∗
H ≻H a
4
L given that a
∗∗
H ∼H a
∗∗
L at the RSW allocation. For the
low-risk agents, on the other hand, letting ∆ = UL (a
∗∗
L )−max {UL (a
∗∗
H ) , UL (a)} suffices for a
4
L ≻L a
∗∗
H ,a. Finally,
since the low-risk agents are under-insured at the RSW allocation, the substitution of a0L with a
∗∗
L works also for
the profits, giving ΠL
(
a
4
L
)
> ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) = 0. Needless to say, there are also here two possible ways to select (κ, ǫ),
partitioning the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 5 on the basis of whether or not w40L ≥ w
∗∗
0L.
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pooling policy are the only ones that have been introduced at stage 1, it mounts a strictly-profitable
deviation.
In that case, it is strictly-dominant for the low-risk type to select a4L over a. As a result,
applications for the pooling policy at stage 2, if there exist any, cannot but come exclusively from
high-risk agents. Hence, any insurer offering the pooling policy should expect losses and view its
withdrawal as the only sequentially-rational choice at stage 3. Anticipating this, however, and
whatever her preference between a and a∗∗H , the high-risk type cannot but apply for the latter at
stage 2. Nevertheless, the deviant menu is strictly-separating and expects to make profits against
the low-risk agents and break even on the high-risk ones.
Figure 5: Deviations and Equilibria in Hellwig’s game
Evidently, whenever the RS policy is a Nash equilibrium in the previous version of the game,
the path of play now evolves essentially in the same way as before. One equilibrium outcome is
always that firms offer the RS menu at stage 1, in order to honor it at stage 3, while all agents select
the RS contract designed for their type. The only difference is that now an additional equilibrium
scenario obtains when there is a unique a1 ∈ FO∗M : a
1 %L a
∗∗
L . Of course, by the continuity of
the preference %L, it cannot be then but a
1 ∼L a
∗∗
L (see the right-hand side diagram of Figure 5).
In this case, it is an equilibrium for this contract to be offered as a pooling policy at stage 1 in
order to be honored at stage 3. Correspondingly, its suppliers believe that its applicants form a
representative sample of the population and indeed every customer is applying for this contract.
As before, the reason why each of these two scenarios can be supported as equilibrium is the
very fact that no deviation can mount a credible threat against either unless it pulls away low-risk
customers.9 In both equilibrium outcomes, however, the low-risk type enjoys the welfare she gets
9Indeed, no contract can attract only the high-risk type and avoid losses doing so. With respect to the RSW
menu, this has been shown in the proof of the “if” part of Proposition 4. Regarding the pooling policy a1, suppose to
the contrary that a ∈ R2+ gives ΠH (a) ≥ 0 and a
1 %L a ≻H a
1. Then if, on the one hand, a1 ≻H a
∗∗
H , the separating
menu
{
a
1,a
}
Pareto-dominates the RSW allocation (recall that a1 ∼L a
∗∗
L ) while satisfying the constraints of the
efficiency problem the latter solves (observe that pL < pH implies that pL < p and, thus, ΠM
(
a
1
)
≤ ΠL
(
a
1
)
, the
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under the RSW allocation. It follows then that she cannot be offered a strictly-better outcome by
any deviant menu that is designed to be strictly-profitable while separating. Given, moreover, that
the Nash equilibrium does exist in the previous version of the game, the only deviant contracts
that can attract the low-risk agents and be strictly-profitable as pooling policies are those whose
pools of applicants exhibit a fraction of low-risk agents higher than λ.10
But against these contracts, withdrawing the equilibrium policy is both credible and sufficient
a threat. To see this for the pooling policy a1, let the deviant firm believe that honoring its policy
at stage 3 will be profitable, a consistent belief only if the policy-selection strategies at stage 2 are
such that a larger than λ fraction of its customers are low-risk. Given these strategies, however, a
smaller than λ fraction of those selecting a1 are low-risk. As a result, the firms offering the latter
policy ought to expect losses and plan to withdraw it at stage 3. Yet, anticipating this at stage 2,
none of the customers should apply for a1. Their only sequentially-rational choice is to select the
deviant contract, rendering it pooling with an average quality of applicants exactly equal to the
population one. Which contradicts, of course, the deviant suppliers’ original belief that honoring
their policy at stage 3 will be profitable. Needless to say, the same scenario supports also the RS
menu as equilibrium. As this delivers zero profits in every possible contingency, its withdrawal is
not necessitated by the deviation but suffices as a credible threat against it.
The equilibrium predictions are different, however, and dramatically so, whenever the previous
version of the game has no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. As we know already, this obtains
when there are contracts that expect positive (resp. zero) profits as pooling policies and are weakly
(resp. strictly) preferred by the low-risk type to her RS contract. In this case, the RS menu and
any pooling policy a∗ ∈ FO∗M : a
∗ %L a
∗∗
L can be sustained as pure-strategy sequential equilibria.
These are the pooling contracts on the segment between a1 and a5 in Figure 4. Recall that none of
them were equilibrium in the previous version because, for each one, there existed deviant contracts
certain to make strictly-positive profits (in some cases as pooling policies, in others servicing only
the low-risk type) in the presence of the original policy. Yet, policies can be withdrawn now at
stage 3 and this, being common knowledge amongst the players, renders the actual profitability of
these deviations dependent upon the players’ beliefs about their profitability.
Once again, these policies can be supported as equilibria because no deviation can mount a
credible threat against them unless it pulls away low-risk customers. Given, however, that the low-
risk type is at least as well-off as under the RSW allocation, she cannot be offered a strictly-better
outcome by any deviant menu that is designed to be a strictly-profitable separating policy. In this
inequality being strict as long as a1 6= 0; recall also that ΠM
(
a
1
)
= 0). If, on the other hand, a∗∗H %H a
1, the
contradiction becomes that the separating (recall that a1 ∼L a
∗∗
L ≻L a
∗∗
H ) menu
{
a
1,a∗∗H
}
solves the RSW problem
∀µ [0, 1] even though it is not the RSW allocation.
10For aˆ ∈ R2++, let pˆ
∗ ∈ (0, 1) be given by Πpˆ∗ (aˆ) = 0. Since
d
dp
(
1−p
p
)
< 0, we have (p− pˆ∗)Πp (aˆ) < 0
∀p ∈ (0, 1) \ {pˆ∗} so that Pˆ = [0, pˆ∗] is the set of average accident probabilities across its customers that allow aˆ
to avoid losses. Observe now that, the previous version of the game having a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies,
it cannot be aˆ ≻L a
∗∗
L unless p 6∈ Pˆ . As long as aˆ ≻L a
∗∗
L , therefore, the former contract may avoid losses only if
p > pˆ = λˆpL+
(
1− λˆ
)
pH , where λˆ is the share of low-risk customers in its pool of applicants. As pL < pH , however,
the last inequality is equivalent to λˆ > λ.
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version of the game, on the equilibrium path, all agents apply for the equilibrium pooling policy or
the RS contract designed for their type. Threats of deviations can only arise from pooling contracts
but none is introduced at stage 1 because everyone believes that, were it to be introduced, it would
be loss-making and, hence, withdrawn at stage 3. Off the equilibrium path, the very fact that a
deviant contract may be withdrawn at stage 3 turns itself into a self-fulfilling prophecy if a firm
decides to offer it at stage 1. In this contingency, the equilibrium strategy may entail two different
prescriptions. One works only against some deviations but does so robustly in a sense to be made
precise shortly. The other may be deployed against any deviant contract without, however, the
latter property.
The first scenario requires that also the equilibrium policy is withdrawn and may be used against
deviations that lie above the line FO∗M (e.g. the interior points of the lower shaded area in the
right-hand side diagram of Figure 2). These contracts are strictly-profitable as pooling policies only
if a larger than λ fraction of their customers are low-risk. For this reason, they cannot be honored
at stage 3 if the equilibrium policy is withdrawn. Otherwise, they would be selected by either type
at stage 2 and become loss-making, their fraction of low-risk customers being then exactly λ (see
Section C.2.1 in the Appendix). This equilibrium scenario is described also in Hellwig [14] (pp.
323), his focus being explicitly on fending off deviations that are potentially-profitable against the
Wilson pooling policy, the contract that maximizes the welfare of the low-risk type along FO∗M
(depicted on the left-hand side diagram in Figure 2).11
Yet, the equilibrium set includes also other pooling contracts on FO∗M as well as the RS menu,
which can be challenged also by deviations on or below FO∗M . Such deviations are depicted by
the interior points of the shaded areas in Figure 4 and in the right-hand side diagram og Figure 1
as well as of the upper shaded area in the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 2 and of the
shaded area on the left-hand side diagram of Figure 1 that lies below the line FO∗M . These cases
call for the second strategic scenario, which is based on an equilibrium-sustaining argument that is
equally straightforward although perhaps not as intuitive.
It rests entirely on the fact that the notion of sequential equilibrium puts rather limited con-
straints on the beliefs players may entertain on information sets off the equilibrium path. As before,
any deviant contract, if introduced at stage 1, will be withdrawn at stage 3 because its suppliers
expect it to be loss-making given their belief about the average quality of its applicants. Now,
however, the equilibrium policy will not be withdrawn in this off-equilibrium event. Threatening to
do so is without bite because the deviant contract can be profitable as a stand-alone pooling policy,
even if a smaller than λ fraction of its applicants are low-risk. It cannot be profitable, though, if
this fraction is too small (in particular, it makes losses on the high-risk type) and the correspond-
ing beliefs of the deviant suppliers are what the equilibrium rests upon (see Section C.2.2 in the
Appendix).
11This is the contract aW ∈ FO∗M : a
W %L a ∀a ∈ FO
∗
M and features prominently in Wilson [31]. Notice that no
strictly-profitable pooling policy may attract the low-risk agents away from aW , unless it lies above FO∗M . This is
because, together, ΠM (aˆ) > 0 and aˆ %L a
W imply ∃a ∈ FO∗M : a ≻L a
W (recall the opening observation in Section
4 in the Appendix), an absurdity.
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2.3 Equilibrium Selection
Re-introducing the third stage of the game, so that the insurance companies may withdraw their
policies if they so wish, leads to a dramatic reversal of the results. Existence of a Nash equilibrium in
pure strategies is no longer an issue. If anything, there are multiple equilibria whenever admissible
pooling policies Pareto-dominate the RS menu. In fact, the issue now becomes that of equilibrium
selection as the Wilson contract strictly Pareto-dominates all other equilibrium allocations.
With this in mind, Hellwig viewed the Wilson policy as the most plausible outcome, being
the only equilibrium to survive the stability criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens [16]. Even though
Hellwig’s claim can be easily substantiated, it was not in his paper; an omission that has misled
later scholars, working on applications of this model, into the view that it can be supported by
the intuitive criterion of Cho and Kreps [3]. Of course, the criterion is indeed an interpretation of
stability and, admittedly, the most straightforward one. In the game under study, however, it lacks
the power to single out the Wilson policy.
The Intuitive Criterion
To restrict the out-of-equilibrium beliefs in a way that justifies rejecting a given sequential equilib-
rium, the intuitive criterion rests upon two integral conditions. The first identifies the sender’s types
that do not have any incentive to send an out-of-equilibrium message. These types should strictly
prefer the equilibrium outcome to anything else they might get out of the receiver’s sequentially-
rational response to the message, given that the receiver might have any belief with support amongst
the types that are allowed to send it. The second condition selects, out of the remaining types of
sender, those that do have incentives to send the out-of-equilibrium message. For these types, the
equilibrium must be strictly worse than any outcome they may get when the receiver responds to
the message optimally, the receiver’s belief being again any belief with support amongst the types
that are allowed to send it (excluding, of course, the types for whom the first condition applies).
Designed for signaling games, the intuitive criterion may be deployed over the sub-game that
begins at stage 2, an out-of-equilibrium sub-path on which, alongside the equilibrium policy, a
deviant one has been introduced at stage 1. In this two-stage subgame, the customers move first,
selecting the insurance policy they wish to apply for. Inducing the firms’ beliefs about the average
quality of applications, these choices are signals the informed players send to the uninformed.
Following the receipt of these signals, a firm chooses whether or not to honor the policy it has on
offer.
In the signalling sub-game, let the two policies introduced at stage 1 be a sequential equilibrium
of the overall game and one of its potentially-profitable deviations, a contract that attracts at least
the low-risk type away in its presence. We will establish that, applying the intuitive criterion, we
may dismiss a non-trivial subset of pooling equilibria as unreasonable. We will also show, however,
that this kind of reasoning rejects neither the also non-trivial remaining subset of pooling equilibria
nor the RS policy.
With respect to the first claim, let the two policies be a pooling equilibrium, other than the
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Wilson one, and a deviant contract which (i) lies below the fair-odds market line, and (ii) is strictly-
better (resp. -worse) for the low-risk (resp. high-risk) agents.12 As we already know, in this case,
the fact that the deviation meets condition (i) means that the sequential-equilibrium strategy has
the equilibrium contract being honored in the signaling subgame so that the equilibrium allocation
corresponds to being insured under the equilibrium contract. By the very choice of deviation,
therefore, the high-risk type strictly prefers this outcome over even the best-case scenario that
might follow her application to the deviant policy (the event in which the latter is honored at stage
3). Of course, the same claim cannot be made for the low-risk agents.
The high-risk type being the only one with strong incentive to not send the out-of-equilibrium
message, the two conditions of the intuitive criterion sort here the two risk-types so that the deviant
suppliers should believe that, with probability one, applications for their policy originate from low-
risk agents. As a result, they should expect their policy to be strictly profitable and, thus, plan
to honor it at stage 3. Applying, therefore, the Cho-Kreps criterion in this example, we are led
to regard intuitively unreasonable that the deviant contract gets withdrawn at stage 3 when the
equilibrium one is not. In other words, we are led to characterize intuitively unreasonable the very
premise upon which our sequential equilibrium argument was based.
Clearly, any of the pooling equilibria that is susceptible to potentially-profitable deviations that
satisfy conditions (i)-(ii) is rejected by the intuitive criterion. This is the case for the entire part of
the segment between a1 and a5 in Figure 4 that lies above aW . In our quest to single out the latter
contract, however, we are still left with the remainder of the segment as well as the RS menu. Each
of these may be challenged only by deviations that Pareto-dominate the equilibrium outcome or lie
above the line FO∗M , in which case the sequential equilibrium strategy requires that the equilibrium
policy is withdrawn at stage 3.13 They are all, hence, susceptible only to deviant contracts that,
if honored at stage 3, Pareto-dominate the equilibrium outcome. And this renders the intuitive
criterion impotent.
When the Pareto-dominance is strict, in the sense that both risk-types are strictly worse off
under the equilibrium outcome, the criterion fails because there is no type without strong incentive
to send the out-of-equilibrium message. Technically speaking, no type meets the criterion’s first
condition, which means that also no type meets the second. Intuitively, we may reason as follows.
As a pooling policy, the deviant contract avoids losses only if the fraction of its customers that
are low-risk does not fall below some cutoff. It will be honored, therefore, as long as its suppliers
entertain the corresponding beliefs, which they may well do since no risk-type (in particular, the
low-risk) is excluded from applying to their policy.
The deviant policy being honored, though, is an outcome that both risk-types prefer strictly to
the given equilibrium. As a consequence, there is no intuitive restriction we may put on the beliefs
12Examples are points in the interior of the shaded area below the line FO∗M in the left-hand side diagram of Figure
1 and of the area that lies between the two indifference curves and below FO∗M in its right-hand side diagram.
13Deviations with the former property are the points in the interior of the shaded area of Figure 4 and of the upper
shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 2. With respect to the latter property, consider the points in
the interior of the lower shaded area in the latter diagram, of the shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of the
same figure, or of the area delimited by the low-risk indifference curve and the lines FO∗M and FO
∗
L in Figure 4.
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of the deviant suppliers regarding the average quality of the applications they receive. Precisely
because either risk-type (in particular, the high-risk) has reason to aspire to their policy, we cannot
rule out that the fraction of their applicants who are low-risk is in fact below the cutoff. It is also
possible, therefore, that they will not honor their policy at the end, leaving whoever chose it at
the endowment point; a prospect unpleasant enough to induce both types to stay at the incumbent
equilibrium.14
This argument needs but a slight modification when the deviant contract Pareto-dominates
the equilibrium outcome, albeit not strictly. In the game under study, this obtains when the
low-risk agents are indifferent between their equilibrium and the deviant contract. In this case,
one type does lack strong incentives to send the out-of-equilibrium message; it (weakly) satisfies
the first condition.15 Being, however, the low-risk type, the intuitive criterion has again no bite.
If anything, intuition should have now the deviant suppliers believe that their applications come
exclusively from high-risk agents. They should expect, therefore, their policy to make losses and
plan to withdraw it at stage 3. Anticipating this, in turn, their applicants should expect to be left
at the endowment point. As before, the feasibility of this prospect is enough to justify that both
types apply for the equilibrium policy even though a Pareto-dominant one is available.
Divinity
Given the impotence of the intuitive criterion in selecting the Pareto-preferred equilibrium, another
obvious recourse is interpreting stability as divinity in the sense of Banks and Sobel [1]. This is a
criterion whose real force comes into play precisely when the first intuitive condition fails to identify
types with no incentive to send the out-of-equilibrium message. Facing situations, such as the ones
described above, where both risk-types wish to defect from the current equilibrium, divinity guides
the receiver’s beliefs by placing more weight on the type more likely to do so.
Inevitably, this entails utility comparisons across types and, hence, considerable loss of generality
for our study.16 More importantly perhaps, adverse selection becomes most pressing an economic
14The worst case scenario for an agent who applies for the deviant policy is to be left at the endowment point. This
is an outcome that cannot be strictly preferred to the equilibrium one by either risk-type. Relative to the equilibrium
outcome, the endowment is strictly worse for either risk-type whenever the equilibrium strategy prescribes that the
equilibrium contract should be honored against the given deviation. It is as good as the equilibrium outcome whenever
the equilibrium contract is withdrawn.
15Such deviations are depicted by points on the low-risk indifference curve boundary of the shaded area in Figure
4 and of the lower shaded area in the diagram on the right-hand side of Figure 2. In the strict sense of the intuitive
criterion as presented in Cho and Kreps [3] (Section IV.3), even in this case, the low-risk type fails to meet the first
condition. Their definition depicts either of the criterion’s conditions as strict preference. Yet, one could consider
relaxing the first to a weak preference (as, in fact, the authors themselves do in Section IV.5). In the game under
study, however, even this cannot render the criterion useful. There is no type that satisfies (even weakly) the second
condition. Even if there were, actually, it could only be the high-risk and the withdrawal of the deviant policy would
again be the only intuitive outcome.
16Upon receipt of a message, our receiver has only two pure responses available, withdraw (W) or honor (NW) the
policy on offer. We may depict, therefore, her mixed strategy by the probability r ∈ [0, 1] with which she withdraws
her policy at stage 3. Then, in terms of the divinity presentation in Cho and Kreps [3] (Section IV.4), for either
17
issue exactly if high-risk agents gain more than low-risk ones under a socially-desirable policy
change. And in this case, by placing more likelihood on the high-risk type, divinity as well precludes
the Pareto-dominant alternative from mounting a successful challenge to the current equilibrium.
In fact, in the only case when utility gains here can be unambiguously compared across the two
risk-types (the selection problem in the paragraph preceding the last), divinity leads to exactly the
same conclusion as the intuitive criterion.17
Stability
In our attempt to single out the Wilson policy as the only reasonable equilibrium, we have yet to
deal with a non-trivial set of pooling equilibria as well as with the RS menu. These share a common
feature: they are all susceptible to deviant contracts that are strictly better, at least for the low-risk
type, and lie below the market fair-odds line. And against deviations of this kind, the sequential
equilibrium obtains only via the following strategic scenario (Section C.2.2). The deviant contract
is deemed loss-making and gets withdrawn at stage 3. By contrast, the equilibrium one is honored
because it is believed to be avoiding losses. Anticipating this at stage 2, all agents apply for the
equilibrium contract with probability one.
To support this scenario, we need to construct a sequence of vanishing trembles
{
rkL, r
k
H
}
k∈N
∈
(0, 1) with the intended interpretation that an agent of risk type h applies to the equilibrium and
deviant contracts with probability σkh = 1 − r
k
h and 1 − σ
k
h, respectively. This ought to evolve in
such a way that, at least along a subsequence, the deviant suppliers believe that the ratio of low-
to high-risk amongst their applicants does not exceed the quantity λˆ∗ = 1−pˆ
∗
pˆ∗
(the probability as
defined in footnote XX). And since strategies ought to be sequentially-consistent, this ratio is given
by
1−σk
L
1−σk
H
, the relative frequencies with which the two risk-types apply for the deviant contract.
Let us perturb, however, the game by assigning to each risk-type an independent probability of
accidentally implementing a fully-randomized strategy, instead of the one she is supposed to play.
More precisely, consider a strategy profile (q˜L, q˜H) ∈ (0, 1)
2 and a mixture (ǫL, ǫH) ∈ (0, 1]
2 to mean
that an agent of risk-type h, whose strategy in the original game was to apply for the equilibrium
and deviant policies with probability σh and 1 − σh respectively, does so in the perturbed game
risk-type h, D0h = {rh} and Dh = [0, rh), with rh being the deviant suppliers’ mixed response which corresponds to
an expected utility for h equal to the utility she derives from her current equilibrium contract. Clearly, to identify the
relative sizes of these sets across h, we need to rank the probabilities rh. The same requirement arises with respect to
the the divinity characterization in Banks and Sobel [1] (Section 3). Following an application for the deviant policy,
to construct the beliefs of its suppliers that are consistent with no withdrawal - the set Γ (0) - we have to compare
the schedules µ (h, rh) = [0, 1] and µ (h, r) = 0 (1), if r > rh (r < rh), across h.
17In this case, DL = ∅ and D
0
L = {NW} ⊂ DH = [0, rH) with rH > 0. According to Criterion D1, therefore, no
pooling application may come from low-risk agents. Observe also that, having only two types of sender in this game,
the Criteria D1 and D2 coincide. Regarding the exposition in Banks and Sobel [1], we have now µ (L, 0) = [0, 1] and
µ (L, r) = 0 for any r > 0, while µ (H, rH) = [0, 1] and µ (H, r) = 0 (1) for r > rH (r < rH). Clearly, ∀r ∈ [0, 1],
µ (L, r) = 1 implies µ (H, r) = 1 while the opposite direction is not true. Observe also that this is the only case
in which another refinement, neologism proofness (Farrell [9]), may be deployed here. Given, though, that only the
high-risk type strictly prefers the deviant outcome, this concept, as presented by Banks and Sobel (Section 5), also
suggests that deviant applications ought to come exclusively from this type.
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with probability σ˜h = (1− ǫh)σh + ǫhq˜h and 1 − σ˜h, respectively. Define then any closed subset
of the set of equilibria of the original game to be prestable if ∀ǫ0 ∈ R++ ∃ǫ ∈ R++ such that
∀ (q˜L, q˜H) ∈ (0, 1)
2 and ∀ (ǫL, ǫH) ∈ (0, ǫ)
2 the perturbed game has at least one equilibrium in the
ǫ0-neighborhood of this subset. Equilibrium stability, in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens [16], is
an identifying feature of the minimal prestable sets.18
Given this characterization, the sequential equilibrium scenario under study cannot be stable
unless it remains a sequential equilibrium also under perturbations. Yet, as shown in Section C.2.3,
we may construct perturbations that are arbitrarily close to the original game but for which no se-
quence of trembles can meet the condition limk→∞
1−σ˜k
L
1−σ˜k
H
≤ λˆ∗. Intuitively, the original equilibrium
hinges crucially upon forcing the deviant suppliers to be pessimistic enough regarding the average
quality of the applications they would have received had they not withdrawn their policy. Perturb-
ing, however, the strategies by which the customers select contracts at stage 2, translates under
the sequential-equilibrium reasoning to perturbing the deviant suppliers’ belief about the average
quality of their applicants. And although the mixtures in these perturbations need to stay close to
the original strategic profile, the additional range in the deviant suppliers’ beliefs granted by the
arbitrary introduction of the randomized profile precludes them from being pessimistic enough. As
a result, they find it now optimal to honor their policy at stage 3, a response anything but close to
the one they undertook in the original game.19
Needless to say, this strategic instability manifests itself also when the scenario under consider-
ation is deployed to support the Wilson policy. Yet, the defining characteristic of this policy is that
it is susceptible only to deviations above the market fair-odds line. As a consequence, it can always
be supported also by the sequential equilibrium scenario in which both itself as well as the deviant
contract are withdrawn at stage 3. Being then indifferent between selecting either policy at stage
2, an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson policy with probability σh ∈ [0, 1) : 1 ≤
1−σL
1−σH
≤ λˆ∗
(Section C.2.1).
And this is a set of strategic profiles that contains a stable subset. Specifically, as we show in
Section C.2.4, every profile in the set
{
(σL, σH) ∈ [0, 1)
2 : 1 < 1−σL1−σH <
1+λˆ∗
2
}
remains a sequential
equilibrium under arbitrary perturbations. Which also means, of course, that each of these pertur-
bations has some equilibrium arbitrarily close to the end points of the set. Its closure, therefore, is
prestable. In fact, it is stable because it is minimally prestable. Indeed, with respect to any profile
such that 1+λˆ
∗
2 <
1−σL
1−σH
≤ λˆ∗, there are perturbations that are arbitrarily close to the original game
18This definition of stability is in the spirit of Section 5.6 in Myerson R.B. Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict,
Harvard University Press (1997). Of course, analogous perturbations should be considered also regarding the insurers’
strategies. In the subgame under study, these players can be indexed by i ∈ {incumbent, deviant}. Its pure strategies
being to withdraw or honor its policy at stage 3, let σi be the probability that the ith firm chooses the latter. In
the perturbed game, this becomes σ˜i = (1− ǫi)σi + ǫiq˜i where the mixture ǫi ∈ (0, 1] and the randomized strategy
q˜i ∈ (0, 1) are chosen arbitrarily and are independent from those of other firms and customers.
19Recall the preceding footnote. To show instability, we establish that some strategy σi, substantially different than
the equilibrium σ∗i in the original game, is optimal for the ith firm against the perturbed selections of customers. Of
course, in the perturbed game, the firm’s actual strategy is restricted to be σ˜i. Nevertheless, this can be arbitrarily
close to σi by appropriate choice of ǫi and q˜i.
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and for which the deviant contract will not be withdrawn.
Endogenous Commitment
As the preceding discussion suggests, to single out the Pareto-optimal amongst the many equilibria
of the standard Hellwig game, the notion of stability must be deployed in its pure sense. This is
arguably too abstract a refinement, especially when it comes to applications of Hellwig’s model.
An equally successful but more intuitive one is to restrict the out-of-equilibrium beliefs directly via
contractual commitment. By allowing, that is, insurance suppliers to publicly pre-commit, if they
so wish, at stage 1 upon honoring their contracts at stage 3. This works as equilibrium selection
devise because rendering commitment upon delivering on a contract endogenous is useful here only
to deviant suppliers.
Indeed none of the equilibrium contracts identified in Section 2.2 would ever be introduced via
“pre-approved” application forms because each faces deviations against which it survives only via
the threat of its withdrawal. The Wilson contract aside, however, each is susceptible also to deviant
contracts that lie below FO∗M and offer strict welfare improvements for either risk-type. And against
such deviations, the equilibrium scenario is based entirely on offsetting the customers’ preference
by the belief that the deviant contracts will be withdrawn at stage 3. Yet, this belief is no longer
in the support of their reasonable beliefs if the deviations are introduced through “pre-approved”
application forms. If their suppliers pre-commit upon honoring them, the deviant contracts will be
chosen by all customers at stage 2 and turn into strictly-profitable pooling deviations.
3 Efficient Insurance Provision
Enabling insurance firms not only to withdraw their contracts at stage 3 but also commit at stage
1 upon not withdrawing them singles out the Wilson policy, the only stable equilibrium outcome
of the standard Hellwig game. As a notion, therefore, endogenous commitment on the contractual
level is powerful in delivering uniqueness of equilibrium in pure strategies. And its power increases
even more, along the efficiency dimension, when one allows also insurance suppliers to subsidize
net income across contracts.
The latter structural change enlarges the space of admissible insurance menus {aL,aH} into
consisting of ones that satisfy (1)-(2) and λ˜ΠL (aL) +
(
1− λ˜
)
ΠH (aH) ≥ 0, where λ˜ is the average
ratio of low- to high-risk customers amongst the applicant pool. In equilibrium, of course, the
menu must serve both types of customers and the belief of its provider about the average quality
of applicants cannot but coincide with the population average (λ˜ = λ). This, along with the act
that contractual commitment is now endogenous, restricts dramatically our predictions regarding
the outcome of the Hellwig game. There is now a unique sequential equilibrium which Pareto-
dominates even the most desirable pooling equilibrium. In fact, the equilibrium allocation solves
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the IIE(µ) problem
P2 (µ) : max
(wL,wH)∈R
4
++
µUL (wL) + (1− µ)UH (wH) s.t. (1)-(2) and
λΠL (aL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aH) ≥ 0 (4)
when the weight is placed entirely upon the welfare of the low-risk type (µ = 1).
These are in fact the IIE allocations relative to zero reservation profits, in the sense of Maskin
and Tirole [19]. In the current setting, they can be identified by the following result. Since for a
given parameter µ the solution to the problem P2(µ) is unique, it will be called in particular the
IIE(µ) allocation. An allocation will be referred to as IIE in general if it is the IIE(µ) allocation
for some µ ∈ [0, 1].
Claim 1 For any µ ∈ [0, 1] the IIE(µ) optimum {a∗L,a
∗
H} is unique. Moreover, it satisfies
λΠL (a
∗
L) + (1− λ)ΠH (a
∗
H) = 0
while being such that
(i) UH (w
∗
L) = UH (w
∗
H) = u (w
∗
0H) = UL (w
∗
H) < UL (w
∗
L) if λ < µ,
(ii) UL (w
∗
H) = UL (w
∗
L) = u (w
∗
0L) = UH (w
∗
L) < UH (w
∗
H) if λ > µ, and
(iii) a∗h = a
∗ with Uh (w
∗) = u (w∗0) for either h, if λ = µ.
Furthermore, for either h, the solution mapping a∗h (µ) : [0, 1] 7→ R
2
+ consists of the following two
restrictions
(a) a bijective function [0, λ] 7→ R2+ \ {a
∗∗
h }, and
(b) a function (λ, 1] 7→ R2+ that is either bijective into R
2
+ \ {a
∗∗
h } or the constant (λ, 1] 7→ {a
∗∗
h }.
Proof. See Appendix B.
It will be important also to relate the RSW allocation to the concept of interim incentive
efficiency. As indicated by the following result, in the current setting, this relation is particularly
strong.
Claim 2 The RSW allocation is IIE only if it is IIE(µ) for all µ ∈ (λ, 1].
Proof. See Appendix B.
We will establish that the IIE(1) allocation is the unique equilibrium in the augmented Hellwig
game in two steps. First, we will show that the outcome in question, referred to henceforth as the
IIE(1) allocation, is the only candidate equilibrium allocation. Then, we will argue that the unique
menu which delivers this allocation is a sequential equilibrium of the augmented three-stage game.
To establish that only the IIE(1) may be an equilibrium allocation, it suffices to show that, as
long as the corresponding allocation {w∗L,w
∗
H} of a candidate equilibrium menu {a
∗
L,a
∗
H} does not
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solve the IIE(1) problem, we can construct a profitable deviation. This is based upon the fact that
we can always find another menu
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
whose allocation
{
w0L,w
0
H
}
is IIE for some µ0 ∈ (0, 1]
and which constitutes a welfare increase (resp. decrease) for the low-risk (resp. high-risk) agents
(w0L ≻L w
∗
L but w
∗
H %H w
0
H).
Suppose then that some firm introduces this menu at stage 1 soliciting applications for a0L
via “pre-approved” forms. In this event, being guaranteed a strictly-better outcome, the low-risk
customers will leave the equilibrium menu with only high-risk potential applicants on whom it does
not expect but losses. It follows that the equilibrium strategy cannot but withdraw the contract
a∗H at stage 3. Anticipating this at stage 2, the high-risk type cannot but also opt for the deviant
menu; albeit, for the contract a0H since the menu is separating (being IIE).
Of course, the deviation just described does not offer a clear incentive to potential challengers
of the hypothetical equilibrium. It does attract the low-risk type away but expects zero not strictly
positive profits in doing so. Nonetheless, as shown by Propositions 5-6 below, a strictly profitable
deviation obtains by replacing one of the contracts in
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
with another in a way that generates
a strictly-profitable menu while maintaining the two crucial elements of a successful challenge: the
new menu continues to be separating and, relative to the equilibrium one, strictly-better for the
low-risk customers. As it turns out, which element of
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
we need to replace depends on
whether or not the hypothetical equilibrium menu is itself IIE and, if it is for some µ∗ ∈ [0, 1), on
whether or not µ∗ ≥ λ.
Proposition 5 Let {a∗L,a
∗
H} be IIE(µ) optimal for some µ ∈ [0, 1). There exists then another
menu {aˆL, aˆH} that is
(i) separating: aˆh %h aˆh′ for h, h
′ ∈ {L,H},
(ii) strictly profitable: λΠL (aˆL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aˆH) > 0, and
(iii) such that aˆL ≻L a
∗
L but a
∗
H ≻H aˆH .
Proof. See Appendix C.
If {w∗L,w
∗
H} is IIE for some µ
∗ ∈ [λ, 1), the menu
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
can be chosen so that
{
w0L,w
0
H
}
is IIE for some µ0 ∈ (µ, 1]. There exists, moreover, a contract aˆL which is strictly preferred to
a∗L by the low-risk type, expects more profits than a
0
L when chosen by this type, and sorts strictly
the types in conjunction with a0H (aˆL ≻L a
0
H ≻H aˆL). Examples are points in the interior of the
shaded area in the left-hand side diagram of Figure 6. Here, either of the two IIE allocations offer
full insurance to the high-risk customers and under-insurance to the low-risk ones. In addition,
both menus leave the high-risk type indifferent between the two constituent contracts while both
expect to exactly break even if selected by a representative sample of the population of customers.
By contrast, the menu {aˆL, aˆH} =
{
aˆL,a
0
H
}
expects strictly positive profits.
In all other respects, the scenario remains as described before: the deviant strategy is to offer
the menu {aˆL, aˆH} at stage 1 being pre-committed upon honoring aˆL at stage 3. This applies
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Figure 6: Deviations against IIE policies
also when {w∗L,w
∗
H} is IIE but for some µ
∗ ∈ [0, λ). In this case,
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
can be constructed
so that its allocation is IIE with µ0 ∈ (µ, λ). There exists then a contract aˆH which is strictly
worse than a∗H for the high-risk customers, expects smaller losses when chosen only by them, and
sorts strictly the types in conjunction with a0L. This is depicted by points in the interior of the
shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 6. Here, the two IIE allocations offer full
insurance to the low-risk customers and over-insurance to the high-risk ones. They both leave also
the former risk-type indifferent between their elements while both expect to break even if selected
by a representative sample of the population. By contrast, the menu {aˆL, aˆH} =
{
a0L, aˆH
}
expects
strictly positive profits and the deviant strategy enters it at stage 1 soliciting applications for a0L
with “pre-approved” forms.
Proposition 6 Suppose that the menu {a∗L,a
∗
H} is feasible but not IIE(µ) optimal for any µ ∈
[0, 1]. There exists then another menu {aˆL, aˆH} that is
(i) separating: aˆh %h aˆh′ for h, h
′ ∈ {L,H},
(ii) strictly profitable: λΠL (aˆL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aˆH) > 0, and
(iii) such that aˆL ≻L a
∗
L.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Offering a strictly-profitable separating menu under “pre-approved” applications for the low-risk
contract is a present and insurmountable challenge also when the hypothetical equilibrium menu
does not correspond to an IIE allocation. The only difference is that now the menu {aˆL, aˆH} may
constitute a welfare improvement even also for the high-risk customers. Situations of this kind are
depicted in Figure 7 with respect to the RS menu and the Wilson contract. As we know already,
the latter is the only equilibrium pooling candidate under endogenous contractual commitment.
Regarding the former, the left-hand side of the figure depicts an example in which the RS menu is
not interim incentive efficient even though it is an equilibrium in the Rothschild-Stiglitz setting.
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Figure 7: Deviations against non-IIE policies
It remains to show that the unique equilibrium candidate, the menu
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
that corresponds
to the IIE(1) allocation, is indeed an equilibrium. This follows from its very characteristic features,
being uniquely the IIE(1) optimum.
Proposition 7 Let the menu
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
be the optimum of the IIE(1) problem. Then, it is the
equilibrium allocation of the game supported by the following strategy. The firm offers
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
at
stage 1 with commitment only upon the menu itself, and the plan to withdraw it at stage 3 only if
another firm has offered at stage 1 a menu {aˆL, aˆH} such that aˆL ≻L a
1
L, with commitment on aˆL
or a plan that includes not withdrawing it at stage 3.
Proof. Observe first that commitment upon the menu is necessitated by the requirement that the
equilibrium strategy profile ought to be subgame perfect. In particular, by the need for subgame
perfection along the equilibrium path: along the subgames that begin at stage 2 following the his-
tories in which at least one firm has offered
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
at stage 1 with each of the other firms offering
the same menu or being inactive. This is because, in these subgames, the equilibrium strategies of
the low and high risk-types must be such that they self-select into a1L and a
1
H , respectively. Yet, as
ΠH
(
a1H
)
< 0 < ΠL
(
a1L
)
, it is then optimal for the firm to withdraw a1H . And, against the latter
strategy, the best response of the high-risk customers is to choose a1L. Which renders it, however,
a pooling and, as such, loss-making policy.
Regarding the non-equilibrium subgames, recall first that
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
is such that a1H ∼H a
1
L and
ΠH
(
a1H
)
< 0 = λΠL
(
a1L
)
+(1− λ)ΠH
(
a1H
)
. This means that no menu that satisfies (1)-(2) is able
to attract away only the high-risk type and avoid losses doing so. For it would have to be some
{aˆL, aˆH} such that a
1
L %L aˆL %L aˆH ≻H a
1
H and ΠH (aˆH) ≥ 0. Since aˆH ≻H a
1
H ∼H a
1
L, however,
this means that the menu
{
a1L, aˆH
}
is separating. Moreover, ΠH (aˆH) ≥ 0 > ΠH
(
a1H
)
means that
λΠL
(
a1L
)
+ (1− λ)ΠH (aˆH) > 0. In other words,
{
a1L, aˆH
}
would also solve the IIE(1) problem,
an absurdity since its solution is unique.
The potentially profitable deviations, therefore, involve menus that attract away the low-risk type.
Recall though that
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
is the unique argmax(a1L,a
1
H)
UL (aL) s.t. (1), (2), and (4). Moreover,
24
it satisfies the latter constraint as an equality. By uniqueness, therefore, any menu {aˆL, aˆH} that
satisfies (1), (2), and aˆL ≻L a
1
L must be such that λΠL (aˆL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aˆH) < 0. Let then
{aˆL, aˆH} be the deviant menu under the plan that does not withdraw aˆL at stage 3. If the firm
does withdraw
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
at stage 3, anticipating the withdrawal, the high-risk customers cannot
but opt also for {aˆL, aˆH} at stage 2. Yet, this turns the deviant menu into one that serves both
types, rendering it loss-making.
With respect to the formal argument above, notice that the need for commitment upon the
menu arises only along the equilibrium path and because the Nash equilibrium needs to be subgame
perfect. Without commitment upon the menu, the strategy described in Proposition 7 remains NE
without, however, being subgame perfect and, thus, perfect Beysian. With respect to the non-
equilibrium subgames, moreover, commitment upon the menu is not necessary at all. For the
contract a1H needs to be withdrawn along with a
1
L only against deviations {aˆL, aˆH} such that
a1H ≻H aˆH . Yet, in such cases, the firm would withdraw it at stage 3 voluntarily. For otherwise
the high-risk would select it at stage 2 since a1L ∼H a
1
H , but ΠH
(
a1L
)
< ΠH
(
a1H
)
≤ 0 (Lemma 7).
4 Discussion and Related Literature
Evidently, contractual endogenous commitment - the fact that insurance firms may choose at stage
1 to pre-commit upon honoring a given contract at stage 3 - plays exclusively here the role of
restricting the out-of-equilibrium beliefs so that only the IIE(1) menu may be supported as sequen-
tial equilibrium. For as we saw, on the equilibrium path, this menu must be introduced at stage 1
without “pre-approved” application forms on either of its two contracts. Nonetheless, some com-
mitment has to be present also in equilibrium; more precisely, on the policy level. As will become
apparent by what follows, the IIE(1) menu needs to be introduced at stage 1 as an insurance policy,
carrying the binding promise that none of its constituent contracts may be withdrawn unless the
menu itself is.
Our equilibrium outcome has been known in the literature (see Crocker and Snow [4]) as the
Miyazaki-Wilson allocation. It was established by Miyazaki [21] as the unique equilibrium in a
labor market with adverse selection (due to two types of workers in terms of marginal productivity
schedules) and firms possessing Wilson foresight. In Wilson [31], it is assumed that each firm
correctly anticipates which policies already offered by other firms will become unprofitable as a
consequence of any changes in its own offer. It expects then their withdrawal and calculates the
profitability of its new offer accordingly. For the insurance provision problem under investigation
here, this kind of firm behavior supports always an equilibrium which, with only two risk-types, is
almost always unique. Depending on the primitives of the economy, it entails either the RS menu
or the Wilson contract - apart from the knife-edge case in which aW ∼L a
∗∗
L and both are valid.
Of course, being able to adjust its current actions according to their effect upon the future
choices of its opponents, Wilson’s typical firm is not restricted to Nash strategies. And it is the
extent of the subsequent complexity in firms’ interactions that delivers equilibrium uniqueness.
25
This becomes evident in Hellwig [14] which could be viewed as an attempt to reconcile anticipatory
and Nash-type behavior. The three-stage game permits some anticipation of future reactions but
the resulting flexibility in firms’ behavior is nowhere near that envisioned by Wilson. Requiring,
in addition, sequential rationality and consistent beliefs leads to a rich superset of equilibrium
outcomes.
The latter observation is of importance when comparing Miyazaki’s result with ours. Both stud-
ies regard firms as sophisticated enough to aggregate profits across contracts within douplet menus.
And both deliver the IIE(1) allocation as the unique outcome, albeit of a Wilson equilibrium in one
but sequential in the other.20 We obtain it from Hellwig’s game when commitment on insurance
promises becomes endogenous. This is what keeps our equilibrium set singleton. It also adds a
realistic component in the dynamics of insurance provision. Our analysis treats both the practice
of requiring applications (which sellers regularly include as part of the insurance transaction) as
well as the option to refrain from it (which is also commonly observed) as rational strategies for
identifying high-risk buyers and enticing low-risk ones.
As a strategic element, the application process was first studied in Grossman [12]. It induced the
high-risk buyers to conceal their identity by mimicking the low-risk choice when offered a separating
contractual arrangement. Given that competition imposes zero aggregate profits on menus, the
high-risk contract is necessarily loss-making and the firm has a clear incentive to avoid its delivery.
Having sorted its customers with a separating menu, it can do so by rejecting applications known
to be coming from the high-risk type. It will deliver instead her RS contract, the full-information
allocation a high-risk customer can guarantee herself simply by announcing her type. Being able
to foresee this, high-risk customers cannot but dissemble their preferences, turning the low-risk
contract into a loss-making pooling policy. For the insurance economy under consideration here,
we are led back to the Wilson equilibrium even if firms can subsidize net income across contracts.
Now, of course, also the high-risk customers engage in non-Nash strategic behavior, anticipat-
ing the effect of their current choices on the sellers’ future reactions. This notwithstanding, the
strategic dimension of the application process remains at work even when the underlying structure
is game-theoretic. Interpreting the rejection of an application as the withdrawal of the respective
contractual offer at stage 3, we cannot but conclude that no separating menu can be sustained as
Nash equilibrium, unless it gets introduced as a policy. Yet, this is now a result of signalling rather
than preference dissembling. The high-risk customers ought to be served on the equilibrium path.
If they apply, however, for the high-risk contract at stage 2, the firm can infer their type at stage 3.
20There is another difference between the two studies, the underlying economic problem. In a labor market, it is
natural to interpret contractual agreements as points in the wage-effort space and take effort as affecting firms’ profits
through the marginal productivity of labor. This schedule differs across worker-types but it may do so isomorphically-
enough for the IIE(1) allocation to be actually first-best. As shown by his example, under certain parameter values
of Miyazaki’s model, it may be efficient even under full information. This cannot happen in our standard model of
an insurance market. Taking the accident probabilities as given exogenously, independent of one’s contractual choice,
the iso-profits are always linear. More importantly, they have a particular conal shape between the risk-types which,
in conjunction with the downward-sloping indifference curves, precludes the IIE(1) allocation from ever solving the
full-information efficiency problem.
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In the signalling subgame, therefore, its optimal response is to withdraw this contract. And, this
being a subgame reached in equilibrium, refusing service must be in the firm’s overall strategy.
Grossman presented his insight mainly as a critique against Miyazaki’s thesis which identified a
given menu of wage-effort contracts with the internal wage structure of a particular firm. It viewed
subsequently free exit from the market as sanctioning the withdrawal of entire menus, but not of
only an individual contract from a menu. This is admittedly too strong an assumption regarding
the market for insurance provision. Here, firms conventionally require customers to apply for
particular contracts on a personal basis and they can do so independently of their practice on other
elements in their menus. For this reason, the withdrawal of individual insurance contracts ought
to be part of an environment with menus. And, as we saw in the preceding paragraph, it ought
then to preclude separating contractual arrangements in equilibrium if the underlying structure is
Hellwig’s three-stage game.
In this case, the set of equilibrium outcomes would still be much richer than the one Grossman
imagined, even with two risk-types. In fact, it would coincide with the one in the standard Hellwig
model because the analysis of Section 2.2 applies even when firms are allowed to cross-subsidize net
income within menus. Specifically, sequential rationality would allow for deviations by separating
menus to be neutralized by the perception that the composition of their pools of applicants would
be such that they are deemed loss-making and withdrawn. However, in the light of the latter part
of the preceding section, this depends crucially upon the firms’ being unable to commit on the
contractual or policy level.
Under endogenous commitment, a dramatic reversal takes place: the equilibrium cannot but
entail a separating contractual arrangement. As follows immediately from our analysis, if firms
may choose whether to commit but only on individual contracts, the equilibrium is uniquely the
RS menu whenever this is the IIE(1) allocation; otherwise, an equilibrium in pure strategies does not
exist. If, in addition, they can introduce menus as policies, the equilibrium is uniquely and always
the IIE(1) policy. For it should be clear from the preceding discussion that, on the equilibrium
path, the firm ought to condition itself to not withdraw an individual contract from the equilibrium
menu unless it withdraws the latter all together. Yet, this is now a matter of strategic choice, not
exogenous restriction. It is the firm’s optimal response to the equilibrium strategy of the high-risk
type. The latter selects the high-risk contract from the IIE(1) menu only if this has been introduced
as a policy; otherwise, it opts for the low-risk contract.
Given this epexegesis regarding the strategic underpinnings of our equilibrium outcome, we may
turn our attention to its properties and compare it with equilibria in the pertinent literature. In
doing so, our principal aim is to provide a convincing account for the central message of the present
paper. Namely, under a simple theoretical structure, the augmented version of Hellwig’s three-stage
game, the forces of market competition should converge upon a single insurance allocation, the most
desirable out of those that are efficient under adverse selection. To this end, it is best to first fix
ideas about what efficiency ought to mean in the economic environment under investigation.
The standard efficiency concept in economics is the Pareto criterion, mainly due to its obvious
appeal when information is complete (no individual has information, about her preferences, endow-
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ments, or productive capacity, which is not known by all other individuals). By definition, whenever
a given allocation is Pareto-inefficient, there exists another feasible allocation which improves the
individuals’ welfare unambiguously (in the sense that certainly some individual will be made better
off and, equally certainly, no individual will be made worse off). All it takes, therefore, to achieve
an unambiguously better economic outcome is for a good (and benevolent) enough outsider to
identify and suggest this alternative. And even in the absence of such a welfare economist or social
planner, an argument often known as Coase’s Theorem suggests that we should still expect to move
towards the Pareto-dominant allocation, as long as the costs of bargaining amongst individuals are
insignificant. For if bargaining is costless, any of the individuals who will be made better off under
the new outcome has a clear incentive to propose the reallocation while no one else has reason to
object.
The strength of endorsing Pareto efficiency this way lies in anonymity: to justify a departure
from Pareto-inefficient outcomes, there is no need for weighted distributions of gains and losses
amongst individuals because no one looses. Its weakness is that it leaves open the question of
who is to find the Pareto-improving allocation, an outside planner or members of the economy. It
entails, that is, a normative and a positive justification, respectively. Of course, this distinction
does not matter under complete information because, without loss of generality, we may assume
that the planner knows everything individuals know, which is everything known (indeed, nothing
precludes us from anointing any individual as planner).
The distinction is important, though, for economies with incomplete information. In these
economies, the individual members have different private information at the time when choices
are made. As a result, their decisions and the subsequent outcome depend upon the state of
the individuals’ information. What matters, therefore, is the decision rule or mechanism, the
specification of how decisions are determined as a function of the individuals’ information. When
the comparison is between mechanisms, however, the normative and positive interpretation of the
Pareto criterion may no longer be in agreement. Indeed, the former might admit decision rules the
latter would not allow. For it could well be that individuals would unanimously agree to substitute
one decision rule with another even though an outside planner could not have identified the new
rule as Pareto-improving.
Yet, the role of an outside planner is precisely what an economic theorist assumes when it comes
to mechanism design and implementation. To ensure, therefore, that our normative view of Pareto
efficiency is not contradicted by that of the individuals in the economy under study, we cannot but
disregard a decision rule if it depends upon information individuals hold privately and do not want
to reveal. We have to restrict attention, that is, to incentive-compatible decision rules, mechanisms
that incentivise each individual to report her private information honestly given that everyone else
does the same.
Within the class of incentive-compatible mechanisms, the resulting Pareto-optimal allocations
are the ones that achieve incentive efficiency. Albeit stemming from an intuitive requirement, this
criterion is subject to when decision rules come up for welfare evaluation because what is optimal for
an individual depends crucially on what information she possesses at the time. And, for economies
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like the market for insurance under consideration here, where at the time she is called upon to
act each buyer knows only her private information (her own probability of incurring an income
loss), the relevant evaluation stage is the interim one. Indeed, IIE is the appropriate criterion since
there cannot be unanimous agreement to depart from an IIE decision rule if some individual knows
just her own private information (see Theorem 1 and the subsequent discussion in Holmstrom and
Myerson [15]).
In the present setting, a (degenerate) decision rule is nothing but a (douplet) menu of contracts.
This describes completely, in each state of the world, how income is allocated between customers and
firms per customer-type. As a result, on the one hand, since only one individual (the customers) is
informed, condition (1) defines the incentive-compatible allocations. On the other, as competition
ensures that firms cannot extract social surplus, the objective function for Pareto-optimality is
given by that of the IIE problem, where the weights depend only on the type of the informed party
precisely because interim efficiency is the relevant concept.21 In fact, the two optimality problems
of the preceding section define, respectively, the RSW and interim incentive efficient allocations in
Maskin and Tirole [19], the reservation allocation being the null trade.22
Section 7 of that seminal study considered a three-stage game similar to the one we do, but
under a significant generalization of what is meant by contractual arrangement. It assumed that
at least two uniformed parties (UP) begin by simultaneously proposing contracts to one informed
(IP). A contract, though, is actually a mechanism; it specifies a game form to be played between the
two parties, the set of possible actions for each, and an allocation for each pair of their strategies.
Following the proposal stage, the IP responds at stage 2. If she accepts a proposal, that game
is played out and each party receives the respective outcome at stage 3. Otherwise, each gets its
reservation payoff; a contingency that, in a modification, gets replaced by another game in which
the two parties alternate in making proposals.
Under this three-stage game, the ensuing set of equilibrium outcomes is very large, even in our
simple economy. Since any IIE allocation meets (4) with equality and whatever the value of λ, it
does satisfy condition (iv) of Maskin and Tirole’s Proposition 7. Any allocation, therefore, is an
equilibrium one as long as it satisfies (1), (2), and (4), the latter with equality (see their Proposition
12). It is supported as such by a strategy which prescribes that, following a strictly-profitable
deviation by another UP, the outcome of the equilibrium mechanism would be an allocation that
21Technically speaking, this claim needs more general decision rules, mapping the type-space {H,L} to possibly
random allocations (probability distributions on the feasible set A). With respect to such mechanisms, the functions
Uh (·) are linear and, consequently, the constraint set is convex as required. For the economy under study, however,
the claim does apply even when only deterministic allocations are considered because, as shown by our analysis in
the Appendix, the solutions to the IIE problem are of this kind. These were described also in Crocker and Snow [4]
(see their Theorem 1). Yet, the present formulation is more general and our analysis more complete as we follow
the Khun-Tucker approach. Given that the constraint set is not convex when attention is restricted to deterministic
allocations, it is not immediate that the Lagrange conditions are necessary and sufficient for optimality.
22To be exact, we refer to their respective counterparts when only deterministic allocations are considered. This is,
however, without loss of generality (recall the preceding footnote). We introduce also, with (2), individual-rationality
constraints for the customers but this is again without consequence as they do not matter in either problem.
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all IP types prefer strictly to that of the deviant.
Yet, this allocation is offered by the equilibrium strategy as a latent threat, not to be delivered
necessarily in equilibrium. And this is important in explaining why the Maskin-Tirole result seems
so at odds with ours. It indicates fundamental dependence on mechanisms that are much more
general that the ones in the present paper, even when attention is restricted to deterministic
allocations. Both papers focus on incentive-compatible allocations; hence, on mechanisms in which
truthful revelation is a Nash equilibrium (it is in the interest of each informed player to report her
type honestly given that everyone else does the same). Nevertheless, seen as mechanisms, all of the
games in the two preceding sections stay within the realm of direct revelation. They do not allow
equilibrium strategies with latent contracts, to be offered in some off-equilibrium contingency but
never implemented in equilibrium.
Of course, this is not the only difference between the two studies. Another emerges in the
light of the modified game where mechanism design gets influenced also by the IP. In this case,
the equilibrium set shrinks to the outcomes that satisfy the constraints of the IIE problem and
(weakly) Pareto-dominate the RSW allocation (see Propositions 13 and 6 in Maskin and Tirole [19]).
Equivalently, to the set of equilibrium allocations when the original game entails signalling rather
than screening, the IP being now the one to propose mechanisms. And, under this perspective, the
distinction between the two papers is drawn even sharper. Our augmented version of the Hellwig
game leads to a unique equilibrium allocation with such properties that this game ought to be
singled out by the IP under any reasonable theory of mechanism selection. It requires, however,
that commitment on insurance provision is endogenous, both on the contractual and the policy
level. And, within the Maskin-Tirole approach, the IP cannot exploit this element, even when she
is able to stir the process towards a unique equilibrium.
When customers are the ones acting at stage 1, the game form restricts itself to the signalling
subgame, the signal being now to suggest a particular contractual arrangement rather than select
one already on offer. Adjusting, hence, our analysis in Section 2.2, it is easy to see that any ad-
missible menu with the requisite dominance property, be it separating or trivial, may be supported
as sequential equilibrium. It can be guarded against any deviation by the perception that the
composition of the pool of customers who suggest the deviant menu renders it loss-making and,
thus, precludes any firm from accepting it at stage 2. This logic was deployed above to import
Grossman’s insight into a version of Hellwig’s game that was standard, apart from the fact that
firms could subsidize net income across contracts. Under signalling, however, it produces a rich set
of separating equilibrium allocations because, standing on the receiving end of insurance proposals,
firms are no longer able to sort customers at will.
They can do so only with the consent of the low-risk type and by using the intuitive criterion,
a combination powerful enough to admit only one equilibrium outcome. Given any equilibrium
menu, separating or trivial, low-risk customers can signal their type by suggesting a contract which
makes them (resp. the high-risk) strictly better (resp. worse) off and is strictly profitable when sold
only to the low-risk type. More importantly, under the intuitive criterion, their communication is
credible since firms interpret it as originating exclusively from this type. The lone survivor is the
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RS menu, the only allocation the low-risk type cannot improve upon unilaterally without violating
(3) for h = L. This can be verified using diagrammatic examples from the preceding section. It is
also immediate from Proposition 7 in Maskin and Tirole [19]: their condition (ii) is met since our
IP has only two types while the boundary of the feasibility set does not matter.
Hence, when the IP selects mechanisms in the Maskin-Tirole general context, she cannot guar-
antee herself the IIE(1) allocation apart from a special case (when the RS menu is an IIE and,
consequently by Claim 2, the IIE(1) allocation). Yet, the latter is the IP’s only reasonable choice
when she is called upon to propose mechanisms. This follows from Myerson [22]. In this seminal
investigation of mechanism design, an informed party, the principal, plays essentially the same
signalling game as above but for the generalization that the other parties, the subordinates, may
also be informed. Myerson identified a subset of incentive compatible allocations, the core alloca-
tions, and characterized a subset of these, the neutral optima. These are sequential equilibrium
outcomes of the game and form the smallest class of allocations satisfying four fundamental axioms
of mechanism selection.
Intuitively, if an allocation is not core, there must exist another incentive compatible allocation
that would be (i) strictly preferred by some of the principal’s types and (ii) implementable given
the information revealed by its selection, provided that all the principal’s types who prefer the
new allocation are expected to propose it. In the paper, the second property is defined as the new
allocation being conditionally incentive compatible for the subordinates. Here, however, it can be
characterized more simply since the subordinates are uninformed. Suppose that the UP expects
the new allocation to be proposed only if the IP’s type falls in a particular subset of her type-space.
Then the UP should accept it even when he knows that the IP’s type lies in this subset.
In the simple insurance economy under investigation here, free entry and exit ensures that
firms will acquiesce to a feasible allocation {aL,aH} (separating or trivial) as long as it is incentive
compatible and satisfies (4), if it is selected by both risk types, or the relevant condition in (3),
otherwise. Within the realm of these restrictions, the IIE(1) allocation is the unique selection of
the low-risk type and, by satisfying (4) and ΠL (a
∗
L) > 0, implementable if a
∗
h ≻h ah for either h
or a∗L ≻h aL but aH %H a
∗
H . In the latter case, moreover, the new proposal comes exclusively
from the high-risk type and implementability is ruled out as aH ≻H a
∗
H ≻H a
∗∗
H necessitates that
ΠH (aH) < 0 (see the argument preceding Step 1 of our IIE analysis in the Appendix). Clearly, the
IIE(1) is the only core allocation; hence, the unique neutral optimum.
5 Concluding Remarks
In this sense, one may conclude that the present paper leads back to the issue Rothschild and
Stiglitz raised originally, albeit under a different perspective. Our result suggests that the lack of
efficient outcomes in competitive markets under adverse selection may not be due to the presence
of private but rather due to the absence of public information. More precisely, due to the lack
of institutions that guarantee the enforcement of two kinds of public commitments by insurance
suppliers: to deliver on contracts their customers have applied to via “pre-approved” forms and to
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abide by insurance promises themselves have marketed as policies.
Our analysis rests upon augmenting contractual admissibility along two dimensions, an ac-
counting and a strategic. The former allows firms to subsidize their net income across contractual
offers via the deployment of menus. The latter has firms choosing the extent to which they commit
upon their offers. In either of its two forms, the endogeneity of commitment allows the suppliers’
promises to play the same strategic role as the public actions do in Myerson [22]. Indeed, be it on
the contractual or the policy level, an insurance offer with commitment is a decision which a firm
can publicly commit itself to carry out even if it may turn out ex-post to be harmful to itself.
For the insurance economy under consideration here, the interaction between these two dimen-
sions of contactual admissibility renders the IIE(1) allocation the unique sequential equilibrium
outcome of a simple direct revelation mechanism that has been used extensively in the literature
on applications of contract theory. The game-theoretic structure of Hellwig’s model addresses the
issue of existence of market equilibrium in pure strategies in a way that is both simple and realistic.
Its standard version, however, admits multiple equilibria of which only the RS allocation may be
incentive efficient.23 And, when this is not the case, the selection of the Pareto-optimal equilibrium
calls for the exact specification of the equilibrium strategies because it requires the deployment of
stability in its technical sense.
As we saw, endogenous contractual commitment can be used as an alternative selection method.
Yet, even though intuitively straightforward, this restricts the out-of-equilibrium beliefs of market
participants to an extent that precludes the existence of equilibrium in pure strategies if admissibil-
ity is augmented also along the accounting dimension. Existence of equilibrium but also uniqueness
as well as Pareto-efficiency are restored when the strategic dimension of admissibility allows en-
dogenous commitment also on the policy level. In this sense, our equilibrium outcome demands
the simultaneous application of two facets of endogenous commitment in a way that is probably
too difficult to establish via real-world market institutions. More realistic settings, such as that
in Guerrieri et al. [13], might be viewed as approximating it via the unique equilibrium of an-
other mechanism involving market imperfections. Under this view, the present paper outlines the
benchmark mechanism for such approximations.
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Appendices
A Preliminaries
Lemma 1 Consider an open interval I ⊆ R and let the functions F,G : I 7→ R be differentiable
on I, the respective derivative functions being f, g : I 7→ R. Consider also the function ∆ : I4 7→ R
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given by
∆(x1, x2, x3, x4) = F (x4)− F (x3) +G (x2)−G (x1)
If {x∗i }
4
i=1 ∈ I are such that x
∗
1 < x
∗
2 and (x
∗
3, x
∗
4) = k (x
∗
1, x
∗
2) for some k ∈ R
∗, then
∆(x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, x
∗
4) = [kf (kθ) + g (θ)] (x
∗
2 − x
∗
1)
for some θ ∈ (x∗1, x
∗
2).
Proof. By the fundamental theorem of calculus, we have
F (x∗4)− F (x
∗
3) =
∫ x∗4
x∗3
f (z) dz =
∫ kx∗2
kx∗1
f (z) dz = k
∫ x∗2
x∗1
f (kt) dt
Therefore,
∆ (x∗1, x
∗
2, x
∗
3, x
∗
4) =
∫ x∗2
x∗1
[kf (kt) + g (t)] dt = H (x∗2)−H (x
∗
1)
where H : I 7→ R is defined by H (t) = F (kt) + G (t). The claim is an immediate consequence of
the mean value theorem.
Lemma 2 Let the contracts a0 and a1 be such that a1 = a0 + (κ, 1) ǫ for some κ, ǫ ∈ R∗. Then,
the corresponding income allocations wj =
(
wj0, w
j
1
)
=
(
W − aj0,W − d+ a
j
1
)
(j = 0, 1) are such
that
Uh
(
w1
)
− Uh
(
w0
)
=
{ [
phu
′
(
w01 + ǫ˜
)
− κ (1− ph)u
′
(
w00 − κǫ˜
)]
ǫ if ǫ > 0[
phu
′
(
w01 − ǫ˜
)
− κ (1− ph)u
′
(
w00 + κǫ˜
)]
ǫ if ǫ < 0
for some ǫ˜ ∈ (0, |ǫ|) and any h = L,H.
Proof. Let first ǫ > 0. Since w1 = w0 − (κ,−1) ǫ, we have
Uh
(
w1
)
− Uh
(
w0
)
= (1− ph)
[
u
(
w10
)
− u
(
w00
)]
+ ph
[
u
(
w11
)
− u
(
w01
)]
= (1− ph)
[
u
(
w00 − κǫ
)
− u
(
w00
)]
+ ph
[
u
(
w01 + ǫ
)
− u
(
w01
)]
The required result follows immediately from applying the preceding lemma with x∗ = (0, ǫ),
k = −κ, F (z) = (1− ph)u
(
w00 + z
)
, and F˜ (z) = phu
(
w01 + z
)
.
When ǫ < 0, on the other hand, we may write w1 = w0 + (κ,−1) |ǫ|. In this case,
Uh
(
w1
)
− Uh
(
w0
)
= (1− ph)
[
u
(
w00 + κ|ǫ|
)
− u
(
w00
)]
+ ph
[
u
(
w01 − |ǫ|
)
− u
(
w01
)]
= − (1− ph)
[
u
(
w00
)
− u
(
w00 + κ|ǫ|
)]
− ph
[
u
(
w01
)
− u
(
w01 − |ǫ|
)]
and we may apply Lemma 1 as before but for x∗ = (−|ǫ|, 0).
Lemma 3 Let the contracts a0 and a1 be such that a1 = a0 + (κ, 1) ǫ for some κ, ǫ ∈ R∗. Suppose
also that one of the following conditions holds
35
(i) κ ∈
(
0, ph1−ph
]
, ǫ > 0, and w10 ≥ w
1
1.
(ii) κ ∈
[
ph
1−ph
,∞
)
, ǫ < 0, w10 ≤ w
1
1.
where
(
wj0, w
j
1
)
=
(
W − aj0,W − d+ a
j
1
)
denotes the corresponding income allocation for j = 0, 1.
Then, a1 ≻h a
0 for h = H,L.
Proof. Consider first condition (i). Since κ ≤ ph1−ph , by the preceding lemma, we ought to have
Uh
(
w1
)
− Uh
(
w0
)
≥ ph
[
u′
(
w01 + ǫ˜
)
− u′
(
w00 − κǫ˜
)]
ǫ for some ǫ˜ ∈ (0, ǫ). Observe, moreover, that
w01 + ǫ˜ < w
0
1 + ǫ = w
1
1 ≤ w
1
0 = w
0
0 − κǫ < w
0
0 − κǫ˜. The claim now follows immediately due to
risk-aversion (u′′ (·) < 0) and ǫ > 0.
Under condition (ii) the argument is equally straightforward. In this case, Uh
(
w1
)
− Uh
(
w0
)
≥
ph
[
u′
(
w01 − ǫ˜
)
− u′
(
w00 + κǫ˜
)]
ǫ for some ǫ˜ ∈ (0, |ǫ|). Yet now, w01 − ǫ˜ > w
0
1 − |ǫ| = w
1
1 ≥ w
1
0 =
w00 + κ|ǫ| > w
0
0 + κǫ˜ and ǫ < 0.
For the next two results, we denote by
Ih (a) =
da1
da0
= −
∂Uh(W−a0)
∂w0
dw0
da0
∂Uh(W−d+a1)
∂w1
dw1
da1
=
(
1− ph
ph
)
u′h (W − a0)
u′h (W − d+ a1)
> 0 h = H,L
the slope of the indifference curve of risk-type h at an arbitrary contract point a ∈ R2+ in the
(a0, a1)-space. Of course, we have IH (a) < IL (a).
Lemma 4 Taking h, h′ ∈ {L,H} with h 6= h′. For any κ ∈ (IH (ah) , IL (ah)) there exists a
0
h =
ah + (1, κ) ǫ with ǫ < 0 if h = L (resp. ǫ > 0 if h = H) such that a
0
h ≻h ah ≻h′ a
0
h.
Proof. Suppose first that h = L and consider the contract a0L = aL + (1, κ) ǫ for some κ ∈
(IH (aL) , IL (aL)) and ǫ < 0. Define also ∆h′′ = |κ − I′′ (aL) | for the arbitrary h
′′ ∈ {L,H}. By
Lemma 2, we get
Uh
(
w0L
)
− Uh (wL) =
[
phu
′
h (w1L − ǫ˜)− κ
−1 (1− ph)u
′
h
(
w0L + κ
−1ǫ˜
)]
κǫ
=
[
κ−
(1− ph)u
′
h
(
w0L + κ
−1ǫ˜
)
phu
′
h (w1L − ǫ˜)
]
phu
′
h (w1L − ǫ˜) ǫ
=
[
κ− Ih
(
a∗L −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)]
phu
′
h (w1L − ǫ˜) ǫ
for some ǫ˜ ∈ (0, κ|ǫ|). Yet, the function Ih (·) is continuous and limǫ˜→0 Ih
(
aL −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)
=
Ih (aL). For small enough |ǫ| (and, subsequently, ǫ˜), therefore, |Ih
(
aL −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)
− Ih (aL) | <
min {∆L,∆H}. But then,
UL
(
w0L
)
− UL (wL) =
[
IL (aL)−∆L − IL
(
aL −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)]
pLu
′
L (w1L − ǫ˜) ǫ
= −
[
IL
(
aL −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)
− IL (aL) + ∆L
]
pLu
′
L (w1L − ǫ˜) ǫ > 0
UH
(
w0L
)
− UH (wL) =
[
IH (aL)− IH
(
aL −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫ˜
)
+∆H
]
pHu
′
H (w1L − ǫ˜) ǫ < 0
as required. Clearly, if {aL,aH} is separating, we have UL
(
w0L
)
> UL (wL) ≥ UL (wH) and
UH
(
w0L
)
< UH (wL) ≤ UH (wH). When h = H, the argument is identical but for ǫ > 0.
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Lemma 5 Let h, h′ ∈ {L,H} with h 6= h′. Suppose also that a0 and a∗ are such that a0 ≻h′ a
∗.
Then, there exists a = a0 + (1, κ) ǫ, with either ǫ > 0 and κ ∈
(
−∞,minh∈{L,H} Ih
(
a0
))
or ǫ < 0
and κ ∈
(
maxh∈{L,H} Ih
(
a0
)
,∞
)
, such that a0 ≻h′ a ≻h′ a
∗ and a0 ≻h a.
Proof. Let ∆ = Uh′
(
w0
)
− Uh′ (w
∗) > 0 and consider the contract a = a0 + (1, κ) ǫ first for some
κ ∈
(
−∞,minh∈{L,H} Ih
(
a0
))
and ǫ > 0. Let also ∆h = Ih
(
a0
)
− κ for h ∈ {L,H}. By Lemma 2
we have
Uh (w)− Uh
(
w0
)
=
[
phu
(
w01 + ǫˆh
)
− κ−1 (1− ph)u
′
(
w00 − κ
−1ǫˆh
)]
κǫ
=
[
κ−
(1− ph)u
′
(
w00 − κ
−1ǫˆh
)
phu′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
) ] phu′ (w01 + ǫˆh) ǫ
=
[
κ− Ih
(
a0 +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
)
ǫ
=
[
Ih
(
a0
)
−∆h − Ih
(
a0 −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
)
ǫ
for some ǫˆh ∈ (0, κǫ). Yet, the function Ih (·) is continuous and limǫˆh→0 Ih
(
a0 +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
=
Ih
(
a0
)
. For small enough ǫ (and, subsequently, ǫˆh), therefore, |Ih
(
a0 +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
− Ih
(
a0
)
| <
min {∆L,∆H} and, consequently, Uh (w) < Uh
(
w0
)
for either h. Observe, however, that the last
quantity above vanishes as ǫ→ 0. Consequently, with respect to the risk-type h′ and for sufficiently
small ǫ, we can guarantee that Uh′ (w)− Uh′
(
w0
)
∈ (−∆, 0) or Uh′ (w) > Uh′ (w
∗).
Take now a as before but for some κ ∈
(
maxh∈{L,H} Ih
(
a0
)
,∞
)
and ǫ < 0. Let also ∆h = κ−Ih
(
a0
)
for h ∈ {L,H}. In this case, Lemma 2 gives
Uh (w)− Uh
(
w0
)
=
[
phu
′
(
w01 − ǫˆh
)
− κ−1 (1− ph)u
′
(
w00 + κ
−1ǫˆh
)]
κǫ
=
[
κ−
(1− ph)u
′
(
w00 − κ
−1ǫˆh
)
phu′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
) ] phu′ (w01 + ǫˆh) ǫ
=
[
κ− Ih
(
a0 −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
)
ǫ
=
[
Ih
(
a0
)
+∆h − Ih
(
a0 −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01 + ǫˆh
)
ǫ < 0
for some ǫˆh ∈ (0, κ|ǫ|) and sufficiently small |ǫ| to ensure that |Ih
(
a0 −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
− Ih
(
a0
)
| <
min {∆L,∆H}. Regarding the risk-type h
′, though, a small enough |ǫ| guarantees also that Uh′
(
w0
)
−
Uh′ (w) ∈ (−∆, 0) and, thus, Uh′ (w) > Uh′ (w
∗) as required.
With respect to the following two results, it should be pointed out that, in an optimization problem
such as the IIE, D and M being independent is meant to say that none of the parameters enters
the constraints.
Claim 3 For n,m ∈ N∗, let D ⊆ Rn and M ⊆ Rm be, respectively, independent sets of choice
and parameter vectors such that the problem maxx∈D f (x, µ) is well-defined for the function f :
D ×M 7→ R. Let also V : M 7→ R be the associated value function V (µ) = maxx∈D f (x, µ) and
suppose that M is convex. Then V is [resp. strictly] convex if f (x, ·) is [resp. strictly] convex.
Proof. In what follows, given an arbitrary µ ∈ M, we let x (µ) denote an optimum for the
optimization problem. Given also arbitrary k ∈ [0, 1] and µ′, µ′′ ∈ M, we adopt the notation
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µk = kµ′ + (1− k)µ′′.
To establish the result, take any µ′, µ′′ ∈ M . Since also µk ∈ M, for any k ∈ [0, 1], we ought to
have
V
(
µk
)
= f
(
x
(
µk
)
, µk
)
≤ kf
(
x
(
µk
)
, µ′
)
+ (1− k) f
(
x
(
µk
)
, µ′′
)
≤ kf
(
x
(
µ′
)
, µ′
)
+ (1− k) f
(
x
(
µ′′
)
, µ′′
)
= kV
(
µ′
)
+ (1− k)V
(
µ′′
)
Here, the second inequality results from the optimality of x (µ′) and x (µ′′) while the first is due
to f
(
x
(
µk
)
, ·
)
being convex. The latter inequality is moreover strict when f
(
x
(
µk
)
, ·
)
is strictly
convex.
Lemma 6 Let D ⊆ Rn be a choice set such that the problem maxx∈D µf (x) + (1− µ) g (x) is
well-defined for the functions f, g : D 7→ R and the parameter µ ∈ M ≡ [0, 1]. Suppose also that
the sets D and M are independent and let S :M 7→ D be the solution mapping. For any function
x∗ :M 7→ S (µ), we have
f (x∗ (µ1))− f (x
∗ (µ2)) ≥ 0 ≥ g (x
∗ (µ1))− g (x
∗ (µ2)) ∀µ1, µ2 ∈ [0, 1] : µ1 > µ2
with both inequalities strict if S (µ) ∩ S (µ′) = ∅.
Proof. Since the choice set remains the same irrespectively of the value of the parameter, taking
x∗ (µ1) and x
∗ (µ2) to be optimal in the respective problems means that
µ1 [f (x
∗ (µ1))− f (x
∗ (µ2))] + (1− µ1) [g (x
∗ (µ1))− g (x
∗ (µ2))] ≥ 0 (5)
µ2 [f (x
∗ (µ2))− f (x
∗ (µ1))] + (1− µ2) [g (x
∗ (µ2))− g (x
∗ (µ1))] ≥ 0 (6)
That is,
(µ1 − µ2) [f (x
∗ (µ1))− f (x
∗ (µ2))− (g (x
∗ (µ1))− g (x
∗ (µ2)))] ≥ 0 (7)
and µ1 > µ2 requires that
f (x∗ (µ1))− f (x
∗ (µ2)) ≥ g (x
∗ (µ1))− g (x
∗ (µ2)) (8)
Since the result holds trivially if both sides of (8) are zero, we need to examine the following two
cases.
(i) Exactly one side of (8) is zero. Letting g (x∗ (µ1)) = g (x
∗ (µ2)), requires that f (x
∗ (µ1)) >
f (x∗ (µ2)); otherwise, (5) is violated given that µ1 > 0. Similarly, if f (x
∗ (µ1)) = f (x
∗ (µ2)), it
must be g (x∗ (µ1)) ≤ g (x
∗ (µ2)); otherwise, (6) is violated given that µ2 < 1.
(ii) Neither side of (8) is zero. If µ1, µ2 ∈ (0, 1), the quantities on either side of (8) cannot be of the
same sign; otherwise, one of (5)-(6) will be violated. Moreover, µ1 = 1 requires that f (x
∗ (µ1)) >
f (x∗ (µ2)) in (5) and then it must be (1− µ2) [g (x
∗ (µ1))− g (x
∗ (µ2))] < 0 from (6). Furthermore,
if µ2 = 0, we ought to have g (x
∗ (µ1)) < g (x
∗ (µ2)) in (6) and, hence, µ1 [f (x
∗ (µ1))− f (x
∗ (µ2))] >
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0 by (5).
Now, if S (µ)∩S (µ′) = ∅, then x∗ (µ1) [resp. x
∗ (µ2)] is not optimal when the parameter is µ2 [resp.
µ1]. In this case, all four inequalities (5)-(8) are strict and the result follows from two observations.
Neither side of f (x∗ (µ1)) − f (x
∗ (µ2)) > g (x
∗ (µ1)) − g (x
∗ (µ2)) can be zero; otherwise, one of
the strict versions of (5)-(6) will be violated. For the same reason, moreover, the two sides cannot
be of the same sign. Needless to say, the larger [resp. smaller] one must be strictly positive [resp.
strictly negative].
B Efficiency
Proof of Proposition 2
Consider PI(µ) for some µ ∈ [0, 1] and let βh, γh, and δh be, respectively, the Lagrangean multipliers
on the constraints (1)-(3) for risk-type h. The Kuhn-Tucker first-order conditions for an optimum
are given by
(µ+ β∗∗L + γ
∗∗
L )
∂UL (w
∗∗
L )
∂a0L
= β∗∗H
∂UH (w
∗∗
L )
∂a0L
− δ∗∗L (1− pL) (9)
(µ+ β∗∗L + γ
∗∗
L )
∂UL (w
∗∗
L )
∂a1L
= β∗∗H
∂UH (w
∗∗
L )
∂a1L
+ δ∗∗L pL (10)
(1− µ+ β∗∗H + γ
∗∗
H )
∂UH (w
∗∗
H )
∂a0H
= β∗∗L
∂UL (w
∗∗
H )
∂a0H
− δ∗∗H (1− pH) (11)
(1− µ+ β∗∗H + γ
∗∗
H )
∂UH (w
∗∗
H )
∂a0H
= β∗∗L
∂UL (w
∗∗
H )
∂a0H
+ δ∗∗H pH (12)
β∗∗h (Uh (w
∗∗
h )− Uh (w
∗∗
h′ )) = 0 h, h
′ ∈ {H,L} (13)
γ∗∗h (Uh (w
∗∗
h )− uh) = 0 h ∈ {H,L} (14)
δ∗∗h Πh (a
∗∗
h ) = 0 h ∈ {H,L} (15)
β∗∗h , γ
∗∗
h , δh ≥ 0 h ∈ {H,L} (16)
along with (1), (2), and (3). Here, for either h, we have
∂Uh (wh)
∂a0h
= (1− ph)u
′ (w0h)
dw0h
da0h
= − (1− ph)u
′ (w0h) (17)
∂Uh (wh)
∂a1h
= phu
′ (w1h)
dw1h
da1h
= phu
′ (w1h) (18)
and it is trivial to check that (9)-(10) give
(µ+ β∗∗L + γ
∗∗
L ) pL (1− pL)
[
u′ (w∗∗1L)− u
′ (w∗∗0L)
]
(19)
= β∗∗H
[
pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗∗1L)− pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗∗0L)
]
while (11)-(12) imply that
(1− µ+ β∗∗H + γ
∗∗
H ) pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗∗1H)− u
′ (w∗∗0H)
]
(20)
= β∗∗L
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗∗1H)− pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗∗0H)
]
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Our analysis will proceed through a series of observations regarding the characteristics of an
RSW(µ)-optimal allocation.
Step 1
(i). If the low-risk profit constraint binds at the optimum, the low-risk type cannot be fully insured.
We will establish the contrapositive statement, arguing ad absurdum. Let, thus, w∗∗1L = w
∗∗
0L. Then,
UH (w
∗∗
L ) = u (w
∗∗
0L) and the high-risk incentive constraint would read UH (w
∗∗
H ) ≥ u (w
∗∗
0L). Which
cannot be, however, if ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) = 0 because
UH (w
∗∗
H ) = (1− pH)u (w
∗∗
0H) + pHu (w
∗∗
1H) ≤ u ((1− pH)w
∗∗
0H + pHw
∗∗
1H)
= u (W − (1− pH) a
∗∗
0H + pH (a
∗∗
1H − d))
≤ u (W − pHd)
< u (W − pLd)
= u (W − (1− pL) a
∗∗
0L + pL (a
∗∗
1L − d))
= u ((1− pL)w
∗∗
0L + pLw
∗∗
1L) = u (w
∗∗
0L)
The first inequality here is due to u (·) being everywhere strictly-concave (the binding case obtaining
only if w∗∗0H = w
∗∗
1H). The third inequality follows from pL < pH and u (·) being strictly-increasing.
The second and fourth equalities use that w∗∗h = (W − a
∗∗
0h,W − d+ a
∗∗
1h). The second inequality
follows from u′ (·) > 0 since− [(1− pH) a
∗∗
0H − pHa
∗∗
1H ] = −ΠH (a
∗∗
H ) ≤ 0, by the respective condition
in (3). The latter condition, which binds by assumption for the low-risk, is responsible also for the
second equality.
(ii). The high-risk profit constraint must bind ∀µ ∈ [0, 1]. The low-risk one must do so if µ > 0.
Suppose first that ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) > 0. Then δ
∗∗
L = 0 by the corresponding condition in (15), and (9)-(10)
read
(µ+ β∗∗L + γ
∗∗
L ) (1− pL)u
′ (w∗∗0L) = β
∗∗
H (1− pH)u
′ (w∗∗0L)
(µ+ β∗∗L + γ
∗∗
L ) pLu
′ (w∗∗1L) = β
∗∗
H pHu
′ (w∗∗1L)
Recall, however, that u′ (·) > 0 and ph ∈ (0, 1) for either h. It follows that, along with the non-
negativity conditions in (16), µ > 0 requires that neither side in either equation is zero. But then
one equation may be divided by the other to give 1−pL
pL
= 1−pH
pH
, a contradiction. This establishes
that ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) > 0 only if µ = 0.
And a trivially similar argument, using the respective condition in (15) and (11)-(12), shows that
ΠH (a
∗∗
H ) > 0 only if µ = 1. If µ = 1, however, then ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) = 0 from above and the low-risk
cannot be fully-insured (Step 1(i)). Which requires, in turn, that β∗∗H > 0. For if β
∗∗
H = 0, since
µ > 0, β∗∗L , γ
∗∗
L ≥ 0, and pL < 1, (19) gives u
′ (w∗∗1L) = u
′ (w∗∗0L); equivalently, w
∗∗
1L = w
∗∗
0L (under
the strict concavity of u (·)), a contradiction. Even when µ = 1, therefore, it must be β∗∗H > 0
and the argument in the preceding paragraph applies again for the respective condition in (15) and
(11)-(12) to rule out that ΠH (a
∗∗
H ) > 0.
Step 2.
We have shown that both profit constraints in (3) cannot but bind at the optimum, as long as
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µ ∈ (0, 1]. When µ = 0, the profit constraint on the low-risk type does not have to bind at the
optimum but we may take it to be so without significant loss of generality. In this case, we restrict
attention to the allocation {w∗∗L ,w
∗∗
H } we derive below, replacing (3) with its binding version:
Πh (ah) = 0 h ∈ {H,L} (21)
Of course, this is but one of many optima when µ = 0. For then, any allocation {wL,w
∗∗
H } is
optimal, as long as it satisfies the constraints. Yet, {w∗∗L ,w
∗∗
H } is the only optimum that remains
so ∀µ ∈ [0, 1].
Step 3.
(i). The low-risk type does not get full insurance.
This is simply a re-statement of Step 1(i) under the corresponding condition in (21).
(ii). A pooling allocation cannot be optimal.
For a pooling contract a = (a0, a1) to satisfy the two zero-profit conditions in (21), we must have
a0 =
(
ph
1−ph
)
a1 for either h. Which, since pH > pL, means actually that the only admissible pooling
contract is the trivial one (a = 0). Yet, as shown by what follows, we can do much better for either
type than leaving them at the endowment point.
(iii). At least one incentive-compatibility constraint does not bind at the optimum.
Otherwise, UL (w
∗∗
L ) = UL (w
∗∗
H ) and UH (w
∗∗
H ) = UH (w
∗∗
L ) together imply that
pL [u (w
∗∗
0L)− u (w
∗∗
0H) + u (w
∗∗
1H)− u (w
∗∗
1L)] = u (w
∗∗
0L)− u (w
∗∗
0H)
= pH [u (w
∗∗
0L)− u (w
∗∗
0H) + u (w
∗∗
1H)− u (w
∗∗
1L)]
Yet, given α, ζ ∈ R and γ, δ ∈ R∗∗ with γ 6= δ, γ (α+ ζ) = δ (α+ ζ) = α implies α = ζ = 0.
It follows, therefore, that the above relations cannot be unless u (w∗∗0L) = u (w
∗∗
0H) and u (w
∗∗
1L) =
u (w∗∗1H). Equivalently, unless w
∗∗
0L = w
∗∗
0H and w
∗∗
1L = w
∗∗
1H , an absurd conclusion in light of the
preceding step.
(iv). The incentive compatibility constraint of the high-risk type binds if µ > 0.
Suppose the opposite. Then, by the corresponding condition in (13), β∗∗H = 0. Which, cannot be,
however, if µ > 0. For then (19) requires that the low-risk type gets fully-insured (w∗∗1L = w
∗∗
0L)
which is absurd given that her profit constraint binds (Steps 1(i)-(ii)).
(v). The high-risk agents are fully insured.
Let first µ > 0. Steps 3(iii)-(iv) together dictate that β∗∗L = 0 in (13). Moreover, the argument
that established Step 3(iii) showed also that β∗∗H > 0 in this case. And as 1 − µ, γ
∗∗
H ≥ 0 while
0 < pH < 1, (20) necessitates that u
′ (w∗∗0H) = u
′ (w∗∗1H). Equivalently, w
∗∗
0H = w
∗∗
1H as required.
Let now µ = 0. If β∗∗H > 0, it must be β
∗∗
L = 0 (Step 3(iv)) and the result follows again from (20).
The same argument applies also for β∗∗H = 0 as long as β
∗∗
L = 0. While when β
∗∗
L > 0, γ
∗∗
L ≥ 0,
β∗∗H = 0, and 0 < pL < 1 force (19) to require that the low-risk type gets full insurance, which is
absurd (Step 3(i)).
(vi). The high-risk individual-rationality constraint is slack (γ∗∗H = 0).
Recall the preceding observation and Step 1(i). Since the high-risk profit constraint binds and this
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type is fully insured, we have
uH = (1− pH)u (W ) + pHu (W − d)
< u ((1− pH)W + pH (W − d))
= u (W − pHd) = u (W − (1− pH) a
∗∗
0H + pH (a
∗∗
1H − d))
= u ((1− pH)w
∗∗
0H + pHw
∗∗
1H) = u (w
∗∗
0H) = UH (w
∗∗
H )
(vii). The contract for the high-risk customers is what they would get under prefect information.
Under perfect information, each risk-type is offered the full-insurance contract that meets the
respective condition in (21). Geometrically, this the intersection point of the 45-degree and the fair-
odds line through the endowment point, FO∗h. Clearly, w
∗∗
H = w
F
H by Step (v) and the respective
condition in (21).
(viii). The low-risk customers are underinsured (w∗∗0L > w
∗∗
1L).
We have just established that the optimal contract for the high-risk type involves full insurance.
Hence, UH (w
∗∗
H ) = u (w
∗∗
0H) = UL (w
∗∗
H ) and the two incentive compatibility constraints can be
put together as UH (w
∗∗
L ) ≤ u (w
∗∗
0H) ≤ UL (w
∗∗
L ). The inequality between the first and the last
quantities requires that (pH − pL) [u (w
∗∗
1L)− u (w
∗∗
0L)] ≤ 0. Given that pH > pL and u (·) is strictly-
increasing, this necessitates that w∗∗1L ≤ w
∗∗
0L. In fact, w
∗∗
1L < w
∗∗
0L since equality has been ruled out
(Step 3(i)).
(ix). The low-risk individual-rationality constraint is slack (γ∗∗L = 0).
This is immediate once the preceding observation is combined with Lemma 3(i), applied for h = L
with w˜ and w being, respectively, the endowment point and w∗∗L . Recall that either of the latter
two points is on the line FO∗L. Thus, a
∗∗
L = 0+ (a
∗∗
0L, a
∗∗
1L) = 0+
(
pL
1−pL
, 1
)
a∗∗1L with a
∗∗
1L > 0.
(x). a∗∗L is given by the intersection of FO
∗
L and the locus curve UH (w) = u
(
wF0H
)
.
The contract offered to the low-risk type is given by the binding incentive-compatibility constraint
of the high-risk type, UH (w
∗∗
L ) = u
(
wF0H
)
, in conjunction with the corresponding equation in (21).
Step 4.
It remains to verify that the rank condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem (see, for instance, Th.
1.18, Ch. 7 in de la Fuente [7]) is satisfied. To this end, notice that the only inequality constraint
that does not bind at the suggested optimum is the low-risk incentive compatibility one. The rank
condition, therefore, requires here that the matrix
∇(wL,wH)UL (wL)− UL (wH)
∇(wL,wH)UH (wH)− UH (wL)
∇(wL,wH)ΠL (aL)
∇(wL,wH)ΠH (aH)
 =

∂UL(wL)
∂w0L
∂UL(wL)
∂w1L
−∂UL(wH)
∂w0H
−∂UL(wH)
∂w1H
−∂UH(wL)
∂w0L
−∂UH(wL)
∂w1L
∂UH(wH)
∂w0H
∂UH(wH)
∂w1H
− (1− pL) −pL 0 0
0 0 − (1− pH) −pH

has rank at least 3 at (w∗∗L ,w
∗∗
H ). But this is obvious. In fact, this matrix has rank at least 3
everywhere, for its last three columns are linearly independent. Indeed, no linear combination of
them can be zero at the third entry given that pL > 0.
To complete the proof, we should point that the uniqueness of (w∗∗L ,w
∗∗
H ) as the optimum is obvious
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(subject of course to the qualification in Step 2) while its sufficiency follows from the fact that the
RSW(µ) problem has a (strictly) concave objective and a convex feasible set (recall footnote XX
in the main text and see, for instance, Theorems 1.6, 1.14, and 1.19, Ch. 7 in de la Fuente [7]).
Step 5.
The claim now follows by the corresponding condition in (21) and Step 3(x) [resp. 3(v)] for h = L
[resp. h = H]. 
Proposition 8 The IIE optimum {w∗h = (W − a
∗
0h,W − d+ a
∗
1h) : h = L,H} is given by letting
[λ (1− pL) + (1− λ) (1− pH)] a
∗
0 = [λpL + (1− λ) pH ] a
∗
1 (22)
(1− ph) (a
∗
0h − a
∗
0) = ph (a
∗
1h − a
∗
1) h = H,L (23)
and obtaining the unknowns a∗1L, a
∗
1H , and a
∗
0 by one of the following sets of conditions
(i) UH (w
∗
H) = UH (w
∗
L), w
∗
0H = w
∗
1H , and
µpL (1− pL)
[
u′ (w∗1L)− u
′ (w∗0L)
]
= β∗H
[
pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗1L)
−pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0L)
]
(24)
λ (1− µ+ β∗H)u
′ (w∗0H) = (1− λ)
[
µ− β∗H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L) (25)
if λ < µ,
(ii) UL (w
∗
L) = UL (w
∗
H), w
∗
0L = w
∗
1L, and
(1− µ) pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗1H)− u
′ (w∗0H)
]
= β∗L
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1H)
−pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0H)
]
(26)
(1− λ) (µ+ β∗L)u
′ (w∗0L) = λ
[
1− µ− β∗L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H) (27)
if λ > µ, or
(iii) a∗1 = d− a
∗
0 and (a
∗
0h, a
∗
1h) = (a
∗
0, a
∗
1) for either h, if λ = µ.
Proof. Let βh, γh, and δ be, respectively, the Lagrangean multipliers on the incentive-compatibility
and individual rationality constraints of risk-type h and the feasible constraint in (4). The Kuhn-
43
Tucker first-order conditions for an optimum are given by
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L)
∂UL (w
∗
L)
∂a0L
= β∗H
∂UH (w
∗
L)
∂a0L
− δ∗λ (1− pL) (28)
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L)
∂UL (w
∗
L)
∂a1L
= β∗H
∂UH (w
∗
L)
∂a1L
+ δ∗λpL (29)
(1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H)
∂UH (w
∗
H)
∂a0H
= β∗L
∂UL (w
∗
H)
∂a0H
− δ∗ (1− λ) (1− pH) (30)
(1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H)
∂UH (w
∗
H)
∂a1H
= β∗L
∂UL (w
∗
H)
∂a1H
+ δ∗ (1− λ) pH (31)
β∗h (Uh (w
∗
h)− Uh (w
∗
h′)) = 0 h, h
′ ∈ {H,L} (32)
γ∗h (Uh (w
∗
h)− uh) = 0 h ∈ {H,L} (33)
δ∗ [λΠL (a
∗
L) + (1− λ)ΠH (a
∗
H)] = 0 (34)
β∗h, γ
∗
h, δ
∗ ≥ 0 h ∈ {H,L} (35)
along with (1), (2), and (4). And because of (17)-(18) in the proof of Proposition 2, here also one
equation from the pairs (28)-(29) and (30)-(31) can be replaced, respectively, by
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L) pL (1− pL)
[
u′ (w∗1L)− u
′ (w∗0L)
]
(36)
= β∗H
[
pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗1L)− pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0L)
]
and
(1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H) pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗1H)− u
′ (w∗0H)
]
(37)
= β∗L
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1H)− pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0H)
]
As before, our analysis will proceed through a series of observations regarding the characteristics
of an IIE(µ) optimal allocation.
Step 1
(i). The profit constraint binds at the optimum ∀µ ∈ [0, 1].
Suppose that the constraint in (4) is slack at the optimum. Then δ∗ = 0 by (34) and, given
(17)-(18), (28)-(29) read
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L) (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0L) = β
∗
H (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0L)
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L) pLu
′ (w∗1L) = β
∗
HpHu
′ (w∗1L)
Yet u′ (·) > 0 and ph ∈ (0, 1) for either h. Hence, in conjunction with the non-negativity conditions
in (35), µ > 0 requires that neither side in either equation is zero. But then one equation may be
divided by the other to give 1−pL
pL
= 1−pH
pH
, a contradiction.
This establishes that the constraint in (4) may be slack only if µ = 0. However, a trivially similar
argument, using now (30)-(31), shows that the constraint in (4) may be slack only if µ = 1. Clearly,
the constraint in question cannot be slack for any µ.
(ii). Searching for the IIE(µ) optimum, it is without loss of generality to restrict attention to menus
{aL,aH} such that
ΠH (aH) ≤ 0 ≤ ΠL (aL) (38)
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As it will turn out, for any µ ∈ [0, 1], the IIE(µ) optimal contract for the high-risk type a∗H is such
that UH (w
∗
H) ≥ u (W − pHd) - the inequality being strict unless it coincides with the RSW-optimal
high-risk contract a∗∗H . Yet, u (W − pHd) = UH (w
∗∗
H ) (recall Step 3(vi) in the proof of Proposition
2), while a∗∗H ∈ argmaxa∈R2+:ΠH(a)≥0 UH (a) and ΠH (a
∗∗
H ) = 0. Clearly, it cannot be ΠH (a
∗
H) > 0.
It is without loss of generality, therefore, to restrict attention to high-risk contracts that satisfy
ΠH (aH) ≤ 0. The claim now follows because, by the preceding step, it is also without loss of
generality if we restrict attention to the case in which (4) holds as an equality constraint:
λΠL (aL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aH) = 0 (39)
(iii). A menu {aL,aH} satisfying (38)-(39), corresponds uniquely to a contract a ∈ FO
∗
M such
that
a0 ≥ 0 (40)
[λ (1− pL) + (1− λ) (1− pH)] a0 = [λpL + (1− λ) pH ] a1 (41)
(1− ph) (a0h − a0) = ph (a1h − a1) h = H,L (42)
Let a be defined (uniquely) by (42), as the intersection of the two fair-odds lines FOh through the
members of the given menu. As pooling policy, it expects profits
ΠM (a) = λ [(1− pL) a0 − pLa1] + (1− λ) [(1− pH) a0 − pHa1]
= λ [(1− pL) a0 − pLa1] + (1− λ) [(1− pH) a0 − pHa1]
+ λ [(1− pL) (a0L − a0)− pL (a1L − a1)]
+ (1− λ) [(1− pH) (a0H − a0)− pH (a1H − a1)]
= λ [(1− pL) a0L − pLa1L] + (1− λ) [(1− pH) a0H − pHa1H ]
= λΠL (aL) + (1− λ)ΠH (aH)
Given (39), therefore, it must be ΠM (a) = 0, which is just another way to write (41). This equation
being, moreover, satisfied also by the endowment point - the trivial contract (0, 0) - a cannot but
lie on the market fair-odds line FO∗M . Finally, notice that(
1− pL
pL
)
a0 =
1
pL
[(1− pL) a0L − pLa1L + pLa1] =
1
pL
[ΠL (aL) + pLa1]
≥ a1 =
1
pH
[(1− pH) a0 −ΠH (aH)] ≥
(
1− pH
pH
)
a0
where the first and third equalities are due to the respective relations in (42) while the two inequal-
ities follow from the respective sides of (38). Given this, (40) follows immediately since pH > pL.
Step 2.
In what follows, we study the IIE(µ) problem after having substituted (38)-(39) by the equivalent
four-relations system in (40)-(42). Of course, for the menu {aL,aH} to satisfy the two conditions
in (42), we can only consider movements along the same slope as the corresponding fair-odds lines
FOh, i.e. contract changes of the form da1h =
(
1−ph
ph
)
da0h. This means that the solution to the
45
IIE(µ) problem can be fully characterized in terms of the quantities a∗0, a
∗
0L, and a
∗
0H . For the three
equations in (41)-(42) above can be equivalently written as
a∗1 =
(
1
λpL + (1− λ) pH
− 1
)
a∗0 (43)
a∗1L =
1
pL
[
(1− pL) a
∗
0L −
(1− λ) (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a∗0
]
(44)
a∗1H =
1
pH
[
(1− pH) a
∗
0H +
λ (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a∗0
]
(45)
Here, the first equality is simply a re-arrangement of (41) and, given this, the other two equalities
follow from the respective ones in (42).
Step 3.
With no loss of generality, therefore, the feasibility constraint of the IIE(µ) problem can be replaced
by (40) and (43)-(45). Given the latter three equations, we may write
w0L = W −
(
1
1− pL
)(
pLa1L +
(1− λ) (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a0
)
w1L = W − d+ a1L
w0H = W −
(
1
1− pH
)(
pHa1H −
λ (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a0
)
w1H = W − d+ a1H
We may treat, therefore, a1L, a1H , and a0 as our free choice variables and regard (1)-(2) and (40) as
our inequality constraints. Letting β be the Lagrangean multiplier on the latter, the Kuhn-Tucker
first-order conditions are given by (40), (43)-(45), (1)-(2), any one from the pair (28)-(29), any one
from the pair (30)-(31), (32)-(33), (36)-(37), and
λ
[
1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H − β
∗
L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H) −
(1− λ)
[
µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L − β
∗
H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L) = −
β∗ [λpL + (1− λ) pH ]
pH − pL
(46)
β∗a∗0 = 0, β
∗ ≥ 0
(i). Regarding this new formulation, it is the slackness of (40) that distinguishes the IIE(µ) and
RSW(µ) problems.
For if a∗0 = 0, (41) requires that also a
∗
1 = 0 and, hence, (42) reduces to (21). In which case, the
optimum is the RSW allocation.
Step 4.
Hence, in what follows, we take a∗0 > 0. As a consequence, β
∗ = 0 and (46) can be re-written as
λ
[
1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H − β
∗
L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H)
= (1− λ)
[
µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L − β
∗
H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L) (47)
(i). At least one of the two incentive constraints in (1) binds at the optimum
To see this, suppose that they are both slack so that β∗L = 0 = β
∗
H by the complementary slackness
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conditions in (13). By the last equation above, this cannot be if µ = γ∗L = 0 or 1−µ = γ
∗
H = 0. For
then, we would have, respectively, u′ (w∗1H) = 0 or u
′ (w∗1L) = 0; either an absurd conclusion given
that u (·) is everywhere strictly monotone. It can only be, therefore, µ + γ∗L, 1 − µ + γ
∗
H > 0 and
(36)-(37) dictate that both risk-types ought to be fully-insured. But then, Uh
(
w∗h′
)
= u
(
w∗0h′
)
for
h, h′ ∈ {H,L} and, thus, UL (w
∗
L) ≥ UL (w
∗
H) = UH (w
∗
H) ≥ UH (w
∗
L) = UL (w
∗
L); another absurd
conclusion if both incentive constraints in (1) are slack.
Step 5.
The preceding observation allows for an exhaustive investigation of the IIE(µ) problem by examining
the following three cases. In the first two, we ignore the possibility that β∗L = 0 = β
∗
H . As we have
just established, this cannot be if µ = γ∗L = 0 or 1−µ = γ
∗
H = 0. And when µ+γ
∗
L, 1−µ+γ
∗
H > 0,
it requires that both incentive constraints bind, exactly the situation investigated by the third case
below.
(A). Only the high-risk incentive constraint binds at the optimum.
(i). The high-risk [resp. low-risk] type is fully [resp. under] insured at the optimum.
Since only the high-risk incentive constraint binds, we ought to have β∗L = 0 < β
∗
H . By (37),
therefore, it must be w∗0H = w
∗
1H . Which implies, in turn, under- or full-insurance for the low-risk
type: w∗0L ≥ w
∗
1L (recall Step 3(viii) in the proof of Proposition 2). In fact, it suffices here to
consider only strict inequality: w∗0L > w
∗
1L. For, as we have already seen above, if both types are
full-insured both incentive constraints in (1) bind, a situation examined in 5(C) below.
(ii). The high-risk individual rationality constraint in (2) is slack (and, thus, γ∗H = 0).
At the optimal high-risk income point (w∗0H , w
∗
1H), we have now
uH = (1− pH)u (W ) + pHu (W − d) < u ((1− pH)W + pH (W − d))
= u (W − pHd) < u
(
W − pHd+
λ (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a∗0
)
= u ((1− pH)w
∗
0H + pHw
∗
1H) = u (w
∗
0H) = UH (w
∗
H)
where the first inequality is due to risk-aversion while the second follows from a∗0 > 0, pH > pL,
and non-satiation.
(iii). The low-risk individual rationality constraint in (2) is slack (and, thus, γ∗L = 0) for any
µ > 0.
Let µ > 0 and consider the IIE(µ′) and RSW(µ′) problems for some µ′ ∈ (0, µ). Since µ′ > 0, the
RSW(µ′) optimum is given uniquely by {a∗∗L ,a
∗∗
H }, at which point the low-risk individual rationality
constraint is slack (recall Step 3(ix) in the proof of Proposition 2). Denoting, therefore, by a∗L (µ
′)
the low-risk optimal contract in the IIE(µ′) problem, we ought to have UL (w
∗
L (µ
′)) ≥ UL (w
∗∗
L ) >
uL, the first inequality since {a
∗∗
L ,a
∗∗
H } is feasible in the IIE(µ) problem for all µ ∈ [0, 1]. The claim
now follows as it must be UL (w
∗
L (µ)) ≥ UL (w
∗
L (µ
′)) by Lemma 6.
(iv). Given the above, the optimum is fully characterized here by (43)-(44),
a∗0H = d− a
∗
1H (48)
a∗1H =
λ (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a∗0 + (1− pH) d (49)
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and
µpL (1− pL)
[
u′ (w∗1L)− u
′ (w∗0L)
]
= β∗H
[
pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗1L)
−pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0L)
]
(50)
λ (1− µ+ β∗H)u
′ (w∗0H) = (1− λ)
[
µ− β∗H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L) (51)
UH (w
∗
L) = u (w
∗
0H)
This is a system of seven equations in the seven unknowns (a∗0, a
∗
1, a
∗
0L, a
∗
1L, a
∗
0H , a
∗
1H , and β
∗
H).
Here (49) is due to (48) and (45), while (50) and (51) are how (36) and (47) read, respectively.
(v). This solution is valid only if λ < µ.
Recall Step A(i). The solution offers full insurance to the high-risk agents for whom the incentive
constraint binds. That is,
UH (w
∗
0H) = u (w
∗
0H) = UH (w
∗
L) = u (w
∗
0L) + pH [u (w
∗
1L)− u (w
∗
0L)]
and, as under-insurance is offered to the low-risk type (w∗1L < w
∗
0L), it must be u (w
∗
0L) > u (w
∗
0H);
equivalently, u′ (w∗0H) > u
′ (w∗0L) due to risk-aversion. But then, the right-hand side of (51) ought
to give
(1− λ)
[
µ− β∗H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L) <
[
µ (1− λ) + λβ∗H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0L)
≤
[
µ (1− λ) + λβ∗H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
u′ (w∗0H)
≤ (µ (1− λ) + λβ∗H)u
′ (w∗0H)
where the first inequality is due to β∗H , u
′ (·) > 0 and ph < 1, the second one is because u
′ (w∗0H) >
u′ (w∗0L), and the last inequality follows from pH > pL. Observe now that λ ≥ µ implies µ (1− λ) ≤
λ (1− µ), forcing the last inequality above to lead to a negation of (51).
(B). Only the low-risk incentive constraint binds at the optimum.
(i). The low-risk [resp. high-risk] type is fully [resp. over] insured at the optimum.
Since only the low-risk incentive constraint is binding, we ought to have β∗L > 0 = β
∗
H . By
(36), therefore, it must be w∗0L = w
∗
1L. But then UL (w
∗
L) = u (w
∗
0L) = UH (w
∗
L) and the two
incentive compatibility constraints can be put together as UH (w
∗
H) ≥ u (w
∗
0L) ≥ UL (w
∗
H). And the
inequality between the first and the last quantities requires that (pH − pL) [u (w
∗
1H)− u (w
∗
0H)] ≥ 0.
Equivalently, w∗0H ≤ w
∗
1H given that pH > pL and u (·) being strictly-increasing. As before, it
suffices to consider only the case w∗0H < w
∗
1H . For if both types are fully insured, then either
constraint in (1) binds and this situation examined in 5(C) below.
(ii). Both individual rationality constraints in (2) are slack (and, thus, γ∗H = 0 = γ
∗
L).
Observe first that
u (W − pLd) = u ((1− pL)w
∗
0L + pLw
∗
1L − (1− pL) a0 − pLa1)
< u ((1− pL)w
∗
0L + pLw
∗
1L) = u (w
∗
0L) = UL (w
∗
L) = UH (w
∗
L) < UH (w
∗
H)
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where the first equality follows from (42) for h = L while the first inequality is due to pH > pL and
non-satiation. The claim now follows since, by risk-aversion,
uh = (1− ph)u (W ) + phu (W − d) < u ((1− ph)W + ph (W − d))
= u (W − phd)
for either h while u (W − pHd) < u (W − pLd) by pH > pL and non-satiation.
(iii). In this case, therefore, the optimum is given by (43), (45),
a∗0L = d− a
∗
1L (52)
a∗1L = (1− pL) d−
(1− λ) (pH − pL)
λpL + (1− λ) pH
a∗0 (53)
and
(1− µ) pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗1H)− u
′ (w∗0H)
]
= β∗L
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1H)
−pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0H)
]
(54)
(1− λ) (µ+ β∗L)u
′ (w∗0L) = λ
[
1− µ− β∗L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H) (55)
UL (w
∗
H) = u (w
∗
0L)
giving again a system of seven equations in the seven unknowns: a∗0, a
∗
1, a
∗
0L, a
∗
1L, a
∗
0H , a
∗
1H , and
β∗L. Here (53) is due to (52) and (44), whereas (54) and (55) are simply how (37) and (47) read,
respectively.
(v). The solution is valid only if λ > µ.
Recall Step B(i). Since full insurance is offered to the low-risk type and under-insurance to the
high-risk while the low-risk incentive constraint is binding, a trivial adaptation of the argument in
the first part of Step A(v) concludes that u (w∗0L) < u (w
∗
0H). Equivalently, u
′ (w∗0H) < u
′ (w∗0L), by
risk-aversion, and the left-hand side of (55) gives
(1− λ) (µ+ β∗L)u
′ (w∗0L) ≥ (1− λ) (µ+ β
∗
L)u
′ (w∗0H) > [µ (1− λ)− λβ
∗
L]u
′ (w∗0H)
Here, the last inequality is due to β∗L, u
′ (·) > 0 which, along with pH > pL, requires also that the
right-hand side of (55) gives
λ
[
1− µ− β∗L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H) ≤ λ (1− µ− β
∗
L)u
′ (w∗0H)
Observe now that λ ≤ µ is equivalent to λ (1− µ) ≤ µ (1− λ). Clearly, (55) cannot hold if µ ≥ λ.
(C). Both incentive constraints in (1) bind at the optimum.
(i). The optimum is a pooling contract offering full insurance. Recall Step 3(iii) in the proof of
Proposition 2. If both incentive constraints are binding, we ought to have w∗L = w
∗
H so that the
optimum is a pooling contract, denoted henceforth by a∗ = (a∗0, a
∗
1). To specify it, observe that,
taking w∗sh = w
∗
s for (s, h) ∈ {0, 1} × {L,H}, the first-order conditions read now
(µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L) pL (1− pL)
[
u′ (w∗1)− u
′ (w∗0)
]
= β∗H
[
pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗1)
−pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0)
]
(56)
(1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H) pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗1)− u
′ (w∗0)
]
= β∗L
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1)
−pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0)
]
(57)
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λ[
1− µ+ β∗H + γ
∗
H − β
∗
L
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
= (1− λ)
[
µ+ β∗L + γ
∗
L − β
∗
H
(
1− pH
1− pL
)]
(58)
the last equation because u (·) is everywhere strictly monotone. It is trivial, however, to verify that
these three equations together give
(pH − pL) [λβ
∗
LpL + (1− λ)β
∗
HpH ]u
′ (w∗1) = 0
Equivalently, λβ∗LpL + (1− λ)β
∗
HpH = 0 which, each term of the sum on the left-hand side being
non-negative, can be only if β∗L = β
∗
H = 0. Yet, the system (56)-(57) gives then
[(µ+ γ∗L) (1− pL) + (1− µ+ γ
∗
H) (1− pH)]
[
u′ (w∗1)− u
′ (w∗0)
]
= 0
which (at least one term of the sum in the first pair of brackets on the left-hand side being strictly
positive) cannot be unless u′ (w∗1)− u
′ (w∗0). Equivalently, w
∗
0 = w
∗
1 as required.
(ii). The optimum is given by the full insurance contact that satisfies (41).
As it has to provide full insurance, the optimal pooling contract must be such that a∗0 = d − a
∗
1.
This along with (41) defines a system of two equations in the two unknowns a∗0 and a
∗
1.
(iii). Both individual rationality constraints in (2) are slack (and, thus, γ∗H = 0 = γ
∗
L).
Recall Step B(ii). As either risk-type gets full insurance, in this case, we have
uh < u (W − phd) = u ((1− ph)w
∗
0 + phw
∗
1 − (1− ph) a
∗
0 − pha
∗
1)
< u ((1− ph)w
∗
0 + phw
∗
1) = u (w
∗
0h) = Uh (w
∗)
(iv). The solution is valid only if λ = µ.
This is immediate. For the condition is but another way of writing (58) when β∗h = 0 = γ
∗
h for
either h.
Step 6.
The preceding analysis leads to a complete characterization of the IIE allocations. Specifically, for
a given parameter-pair (λ, µ) ∈ (0, 1) × [0, 1], the contrapositives of the observations in 5.A.(v),
5.B.(v), and 5.C.(iv) above leaves one as the unique possibility. If λ < µ, for instance, our analysis
rules out the cases in 5.B and 5.C, leaving 5.A (i) as the only one relevant.
Step 7.
It remains to verify that the rank condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem is satisfied, for each of
the three solutions in 5(A)-(C) above. To this end, notice that, in either of the optima for 5(A)-
(B), there is exactly one slack inequality constraint, the respective incentive constraint. The rank
condition of the Khun-Tucker theorem, therefore, requires that the matrix
D (w∗L,w
∗
H) =
 ∇(wL,wH)UL (w
∗
L)− UL (w
∗
H)
∇(wL,wH)UH (w
∗
H)− UH (w
∗
L)
∇(wL,wH)λΠL (a
∗
L) + (1− λ)ΠH (a
∗
H)

= −

−
∂UL(w∗L)
∂w0L
−
∂UL(w∗L)
∂w1L
∂UL(w∗H)
∂w0H
∂UL(w∗H)
∂w1H
∂UH(w∗L)
∂w0L
∂UH(w∗L)
∂w1L
−
∂UH(w∗H)
∂w0H
−
∂UH(w∗H)
∂w1H
λ (1− pL) λpL (1− λ) (1− pH) (1− λ) pH

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has rank at least 2. As in the RSW problem, this is trivial to verify. Take, for instance, a linear
combination (ζ0, ζ1) ∈ R
2 \ {0} of the first two columns. For this to be zero at the first two
entries, we ought to have
∑
s=0,1 ζs
∂Uh(wL)
∂wsL
= 0 for h = L,H. Equivalently, ∂UL(wL)
∂w0L
/∂UH(wL)
∂w0L
=
∂UL(wL)
∂w1L
/∂UH(wL)
∂w1L
which, under the given utility specification, reads pL
pH
= 1−pL1−pH . Yet, pH > pL
requires that pL
pH
< 1 < 1−pL1−pH .
In 5(C), on the other hand, all three inequality constraints bind at the optimum and the rank
condition requires now that the matrix
D (w∗) =
 (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0) pLu
′ (w∗1) − (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0) −pLu
′ (w∗1)
− (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0) −pHu
′ (w∗1) (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0) pHu
′ (w∗1)
−λ (1− pL) −λpL − (1− λ) (1− pH) − (1− λ) pH

has rank 3. Which is indeed the case since the 3x3 submatrix formed by the first two and the last
column is non-singular. By adding the second column to the first and the last, its determinant is
the same as that of the matrix u
′ (w∗0) pLu
′ (w∗1) 0
−u′ (w∗0) −pHu
′ (w∗1) 0
−λ −λpL −pH + λ (pH − pL)

which is given by [pH − λ (pH − pL)] (pH − pL)u
′ (w∗0)u
′ (w∗1) > 0.
Step 8.
To complete the proof, we should point that the set of first-order conditions (28)-(35) also suffices
for an optimum because the IIE problem has a (strictly) concave objective and a convex feasible
set (recall footnote XX in the main text and see, for instance, Theorems 1.6, 1.14, and 1.19, Ch. 7
in de la Fuente [7]). By contrast, the first-order conditions in Step 3 remain only necessary.24
Proof of Claim 2
Recall Proposition 2 and Step 5 in the proof of Proposition 8. Obviously, the RSW allocation can
be optimal for an IIE(µ) problem only if µ ∈ (λ, 1]. Suppose then that it is the IIE(µ) optimum
for some µ ∈ (λ, 1]. Clearly, it must satisfy either of the two sets of first-order conditions (9)-(14)
and (28)-(33). Which requires that δ∗∗L δ
∗∗
H 6= 0 with δ
∗∗
L /δ
∗∗
H = λ/ (1− λ), in order to have β
∗
h = β
∗∗
h
along with γ∗h = γ
∗∗
h for either h, and δ
∗∗
L /λ = δ
∗ = δ∗∗H / (1− λ). But then, since the RSW allocation
satisfies (9)-(14) for all µ ∈ (λ, 1], it must satisfy (28)-(33) as well for all µ ∈ (λ, 1]. The result
follows given that, for any µ ∈ (λ, 1], either profit constraint in the RSW problem binds at the
RSW allocation and so does, thus, also the profit constraint of the IIE(µ) problem. 
Proof of Claim 1
The first part of statement, the one concerning uniqueness, is obvious. Since u (·) is everywhere
strictly concave, for any µ ∈ [0, 1], the IIE(µ) problem is about maximizing a strictly concave
24Indeed, (28)-(34) defines a system of nine equations in nine unknowns. Yet, thirteen equations are specified in
Step 3 while only three additional unknowns are introduced.
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objective on a convex set (recall footnote XX in the main text). The second part of the statement
follows immediately from the proof of Proposition 8 - in particular, from Steps 1(i), 5.A.(i)-(iii),
5.B.(i)-(ii), and 5.C.(i)-(iii).
Regarding now the last part of the statement, that the solution mapping a∗h (µ) : [0, 1] 7→ R
2
+ is a
function follows immediately from the fact that, for any µ ∈ [0, 1], the IIE(µ) optimum is unique.
To show that this function is in fact bijective on [0, λ) suppose otherwise. Let, therefore, a∗sh with
(s, h) ∈ {0, 1} × {L,H} be optimal for µ, µ′ ∈ [0, λ) with µ 6= µ′ and recall Step 5.B in the proof
of Proposition 8. There must be β∗L, βˆL ∈ R++ such that the seven equations in Proposition 8(ii)
hold, in conjunction with the following two
(
1− µ′
)
pH (1− pH)
[
u′ (w∗1H)− u
′ (w∗0H)
]
= βˆL
[
pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1H)
−pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0H)
]
(1− λ)
(
µ′ + βˆL
)
u′ (w∗0L) = λ
[
1− µ′ − βˆL
(
1− pL
1− pH
)]
u′ (w∗0H)
Recall also that w∗0H < w
∗
1H . Clearly, u
′ (w∗1H) < u
′ (w∗0H) and pL (1− pH)u
′ (w∗1H) < pH (1− pL)u
′ (w∗0H).
Notice also that, since β∗L, βˆL > 0, from the second equation above and (55) we ought to have, re-
spectively, 1− µ′ − βˆL
(
1−pL
1−pH
)
, 1− µ− β∗L
(
1−pL
1−pH
)
> 0. That is, neither side of the two equations
above nor of (54) or (55) may be zero. It follows, therefore, that
1− µ
1− µ′
=
β∗L
βˆL
,
µ+ β∗L
µ′ + βˆL
=
1− µ− β∗L
(
1−pL
1−pH
)
1− µ′ − βˆL
(
1−pL
1−pH
)
Yet, together these two equations lead to the contradiction (µ, β∗L) =
(
µ′, βˆL
)
. When the solution
mapping is restricted on (λ, 1], the argument is trivially similar for the case in which the RSW
allocation is not optimal. If the RSW allocation is optimal, on the other hand, it is so for all
µ ∈ (λ, 1] (Claim 2). 
Lemma 7 If {a∗L,a
∗
H} is the IIE(µ) optimum for some µ ∈ (λ, 1], then ΠH (a
∗
L) < ΠH (a
∗
H).
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that ΠH (a
∗
L) ≥ ΠH (a
∗
H). Then, for any κ ∈ (0, 1), the contract
aκH = κa
∗
L+(1− κ)a
∗
H would give ΠH
(
akH
)
= κΠH (a
∗
L)+(1− κ)ΠH (a
∗
H) ≥ ΠH (a
∗
H). Due to risk-
aversion, moreover, since a∗L ∼H a
∗
H , it must be UH (a
κ
H) > κUH (a
∗
L)+ (1− κ)UH (a
∗
H) = UH (a
∗
L)
again for all κ ∈ (0, 1). Similarly, as UL (a
∗
L) > UL (a
∗
H), we ought to have UL (a
κ
H) > UL (a
∗
H)
for all κ ∈ (0, 1). Yet, given this, since limκ→0 UL
(
a0H
)
= UL (a
∗
H), continuity implies that letting
∆ = UL (a
∗
L)− UL (a
∗
H) there exists κ ∈ (0, 1) s.t. UL (a
∗
L) > UL (a
κ
H) for all κ ∈ (0, κ).
Putting the above observations together, for any κ ∈ (0, κ), we have a∗L ≻L a
κ
H ≻H a
∗
L. But then
the menu {a∗L,a
κ
H} is separating. As it also satisfies the profit and individual rationality constraints
by construction, it is feasible in the PII(µ) problem. But this is absurd. For if µ ∈ (λ, 1), it means
that {a∗L,a
∗
H} cannot be optimal. If µ = 1, on the other hand, it contradicts the fact that the
IIE(1) optimum is unique.
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C Equilibrium without cross-subsidization
C.1 The Rothschild-Stiglitz game
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the contract a1L = a+ (1, κ) ǫ for some κ ∈ (IH (a
∗∗) , IL (a)) and ǫ < 0. By Lemma 4, for
small enough |ǫ|, we ought to have a1L ≻L a ≻H a
1
L. Hence, in the presence of a, the new contract
attracts only the low-risk customers. And by doing so, it delivers profits
ΠL
(
a1L
)
= (1− pL) (a0 + ǫ)− pL (a1 + κǫ) = ΠL (a) + [1− pL (1 + κ)] ǫ
= ΠM (a) + [ΠL (a)−ΠM (a)] + [1− pL (1 + κ)] ǫ
But ΠL (a) > ΠM (a) and, thus, 1 + κ >
1
pL
(
1 + 1
ǫ
[ΠL (a)−ΠM (a)]
)
if |ǫ| is sufficiently small.
Equivalently, ΠL
(
a1L
)
> ΠM (a) ≥ 0, the last inequality due to a being an admissible pooling
policy. Clearly, a1L is a profitable deviation. 
Proof of Proposition 3
Let {aL,aH} be an equilibrium separating policy and observe first that it must be ΠL (aL) = 0.
For if ΠL (aL) = δ > 0, we could consider the contract a
1
L = aL + (1, κL) ǫL for some κL ∈
(IH (aL) , IL (aL)) and ǫL < 0. And this would give
ΠL
(
a0L
)
= (1− pL) (a0L + ǫL)−pL (a1L + κLǫL) = ΠL (aL)+[1− pL (1 + κL)] ǫL = δ+[1− pL (1 + κL)] ǫL
and sufficiently small |ǫL| ensures that |1− pL (1 + κL) ||ǫL| < δ. That is, ΠL
(
a0L
)
> 0. By Lemma
4, moreover, for small enough |ǫL|, we also have a
1
L ≻L aL ≻H a
1
L or a
1
L ≻L aH ≻H a
1
L since
{aL,aH} is separating. Clearly, the new menu
{
a0L,aH
}
is a separating policy that attracts the
low-risk type away from {aL,aH} and makes strictly positive profits. Which is, of course, absurd
given that the latter policy is supposed to be an equilibrium one. A trivially similar argument
produces a contract a1H = aH + (1, κH) ǫH for some κH ∈ (IH (aL) , IL (aL)) and ǫH > 0 showing
that it must be ΠH (aH) = 0.
Suppose now that {aL,aH} 6= {a
∗∗
L ,a
∗∗
H }. Since {a
∗∗
L ,a
∗∗
H } is uniquely optimal for the RSW problem
for µ ∈ (0, 1), it must be a∗∗h %h ah for either h ∈ {L,H} with strict preference for at least one
type. Hence, there are two cases to consider.
Case (i): a∗∗H ≻H aH and a
∗∗
L ∼L aL.
Suppose first that w0H > w1H . Then, u
′ (w0H) < u
′ (w1H) by risk-aversion and, thus, Ih (aH) <
1−ph
ph
for either h. Hence, since pL < pH and, thus, also IL (aH) > IH (aH), letting κH ∈
(
1−pL
pL
,∞
)
and ǫH < 0 allows Lemma 5 to ensure that the contract a
2
H = a
∗∗
H + (1, κH) ǫH is such that a
∗∗
H ≻L
a2H ≻H aH for sufficiently small |ǫH |. Recall also that aL ∼L a
∗∗
L ≻L a
∗∗
H while aH %H aL. Clearly,
the menu
{
aL,a
2
H
}
is separating and attracts at least the high-risk type away from {aL,aH}.
Doing so, moreover, is strictly profitable since ΠH
(
a2H
)
= ΠH (aH) + (1− pH − κHpH) ǫH =
(1− pH − κHpH) ǫH > 0, the second equality since ΠH (aH) = 0 as we have shown at the opening
step of this proof.
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If w0H < w1H , on the other hand, then Ih (aH) >
1−pH
pH
for either h and the preceding argument
applies now for κH ∈
(
−∞, 1−pH
pH
)
and sufficiently small ǫH > 0. To complete the examination of
this case observe that it cannot be w0H = w1H . For, as ΠH (aH) = 0, aH would lie on the intersec-
tion between the FO∗H and the 45-degree lines. But then it would coincide with a
∗∗
H , contradicting
the hypothesis that a∗∗H ≻H aH .
Case (ii): a∗∗L ≻L aL and a
∗∗
H %H aH .
Suppose first that w0L > w1L. Then, u
′ (w0L) < u
′ (w1L) and, thus, Ih (aL) <
1−pL
pL
for either h. For
κL ∈
(
1−pL
pL
,∞
)
and ǫL < 0 with |ǫL| sufficiently small, therefore, the contract a
2
L = a
∗∗
L +(1, κL) ǫL
gives a∗∗L ≻H a
2
L ≻L aL (Lemma 5). Recall, moreover, that a
∗∗
L ≻L a
∗∗
H . Letting, therefore,
∆ = UL (a
∗∗
L )− UL (a
∗∗
H ) since limǫL→0 a
2
L = a
∗∗
L , by continuity, it must be UL (a
∗∗
L )− UL
(
a2L
)
< ∆
and, thus, a2L ≻L a
∗∗
H for sufficiently small |ǫL|. But then, we have a
∗∗
H ∼H a
∗∗
L ≻H a
2
L ≻L a
∗∗
H .
That is, the menu
{
a2L,a
∗∗
H
}
is separating and attracts at least the low-risk type away from
{aL,aH}. Moreover, it is strictly profitable since ΠL
(
a2L
)
= ΠL (a
∗∗
L ) + (1− pL − κLpL) ǫL =
(1− pL − κLpL) ǫL > 0. If w0L < w1L, on the other hand, then Ih (aH) >
1−pH
pH
for either h and, by
Lemma 5 again, the preceding argument applies now for κL ∈
(
−∞, 1−pH
pH
)
and sufficiently small
ǫL > 0. To complete the proof, observe that the case w0L = w1L is not possible. For it would imply
that
UH (wH) = (1− pH)u (w0H) + pHu (w1H) < u ((1− pH)w0H + pHw1H)
= u (W − (1− pH) a0H + pH (a1H − d))
= u (W − pHd)
< u (W − pLd)
= u (W − (1− pL) a0L + pL (a1L − d))
= u ((1− pL)w0L + pLw1L) = u (w0L) = UH (wL)
contradicting that {aL,aH} is incentive compatible for the high-risk type. The first inequality
above is due to u (·) being everywhere strictly-concave (and it is necessarily strict since as we have
seen w0H 6= w1H). The second inequality follows from pL < pH and u (·) being strictly-increasing.
The second and fifth equalities use that wh = (W − a0h,W − d+ a1h) while the third and fourth
follow from the fact that Πh (ah) = 0 for either h as we have shown at the opening step of this
proof. 
Proof of Proposition 4
“Only if.” We will argue by contradiction. Suppose, therefore, that a ∈ FO∗M : a ≻L a
∗∗
L . Since
the low-risk individual-rationality constraint does not bind at the RSW allocation, we also have
a ≻L a
∗∗
L ≻L 0, the latter contract corresponding to the endowment point (also on FO
∗
M ). By the
continuity of the preference relation %L, therefore, there must exist a convex combination of a and
0 such that the low-risk type is indifferent between this new point and her RS contract.25
25Recall that there is a one-to-one relation between contract and income points. The continuity of the relation %L
derives from continuous preferences over lotteries on wealth vectors. Given this, the existence of the wealth vector in
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There must be, therefore, a1 = πa for some π ∈ (0, 1) such that a1 ∈ FO∗M and a
1 ∼L a
∗∗
L . Notice
now that, since a,a1 ∈ FO∗M and π < 1, it ought to be a
1 = a −
(
p
1−p , 1
)
ǫ for some ǫ > 0. By
Lemma 2 then the corresponding income points ought to give
UL (w)− UL
(
w1
)
=
[
pLu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′
)
−
p (1− pL)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′
1− p
)]
ǫ
=
[
pLu
′
(
w′1
)
−
p (1− pL)
1− p
u′
(
w′0
)]
ǫ
for some ǫ′ ∈ (0, ǫ). Here, the second equality is because we let w′ = w1 +
(
− p1−p , 1
)
ǫ′ which
corresponds to the contract a′ = a1 +
(
p
1−p , 1
)
ǫ′ that is also on FO∗M . Obviously, since a ≻L a
1,
it cannot be p1−p ≥
pLu
′(w′1)
(1−pL)u′(w′0)
.
It must be, therefore, p1−p <
pLu
′(w′1)
(1−pL)u′(w′0)
and we may consider another contract a2 = a′ + (κ, 1) ε
with κ ∈
(
p
1−p ,
pLu
′(w′1)
(1−pL)u′(w′0)
)
and ε > 0. As a pooling policy, this gives
ΠM
(
a2
)
= ΠM
(
a′
)
+ [κ (1− p)− p] ε = [κ (1− p)− p] ε > 0
the second equality since a′ ∈ FO∗M . For either h, moreover, applying again Lemma 3 successively
gives
Uh
(
w2
)
− Uh
(
w1
)
= Uh
(
w3
)
− Uh
(
w′
)
+ Uh
(
w′
)
− Uh
(
w1
)
=
[
phu
′
(
w′1 + ε
′
)
− κ (1− ph)u
′
(
w′0 − κε
′
)]
ε
+
[
phu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′′
)
−
p (1− ph)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
=
[
κ−1 − Ih
(
a′ + (κ, 1) ε′
)]
phu
′
(
w′1 + ε
′
)
κε
+
[
phu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′′
)
−
p (1− ph)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
for some (ε′, ǫ′′) ∈ (0, ε)×(0, ǫ′). Yet, κ−1 > IL (a
′) > IH (a
′) and, letting ∆ = κ−1−IL (a
′), we may
choose ε (and, subsequently, ε′) sufficiently small to guarantee that |Ih (a
′ + (κ, 1) ε′)−Ih (a
′) | < ∆
question (and, thus, of the corres ponding contract) is a standard result to be found in textbook derivations of the
expected utility theorem. See, for instance, Step 3 of Proposition 6.B.3 in Mas-Collel A., Whinston M.D., and J.R.
Green, Microeconomic Theory, Oxford University Press (1995).
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for either h. But then
Uh
(
w2
)
− Uh
(
w1
)
=
[
∆+ IL
(
a′
)
− Ih
(
a′ + (κ, 1) ε′
)]
phu
′
(
w′1 + ε
′
)
κε
+
[
phu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′′
)
−
p (1− ph)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
>
[
phu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′′
)
−
p (1− ph)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
>
[
phu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′
)
−
p (1− ph)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
≥
[
pLu
′
(
w11 + ǫ
′
)
−
p (1− pL)
1− p
u′
(
w10 −
pǫ′
1− p
)]
ǫ′
=
[
UL (w)− UL
(
w1
)] ǫ′
ǫ
> 0
where the second inequality follows from the fact that ǫ′′ < ǫ′ while u (·) is strictly concave and the
last one exploits that pH > pL.
Let now the contract a2 be offered in the presence of the RSW policy. As a2 ≻L a
1 ∼L a
∗∗
L ≻L a
∗∗
H
(the first two preferences by construction, the last one by the properties of the RSW allocation),
the low-risk type is pulled away. If a2 ≻H a
∗∗
H , this is also the case for the high-risk type so that a
2
becomes a pooling policy, a strictly profitable one. Otherwise, the deviant contract attracts only
the low-risk type, delivering even higher expected profits. For since pL < p < pH , an arbitrary
contract gives ΠL (a) ≥ ΠM (a) ≥ ΠH (a), with either inequality strict unless a = 0. In either case,
therefore, offering a2 is a strictly profitable deviation against the RSW policy.
“If.” Notice first that there are no separating menus able to steal any risk-type away from her RSW
contract since a∗∗h maximizes h’s welfare amongst the separating menus that are admissible in this
game. Moreover, no contract is able to attract only one risk-type away from the RSW policy and
avoid losses doing so. For suppose that a′ is designed in this way with respect to the risk-type
h. It ought to be then Πh (a
′) ≥ 0 and a∗∗h′ %h′ a
′ ≻h a
∗∗
h for h
′ 6= h. As, however, a∗∗h %h a
∗∗
h′ ,
this would mean that the separating menu
{
a∗∗h′ ,a
′
}
Pareto-dominates the RSW allocation while
satisfying the constraints of the efficiency problem the latter solves. Which is absurd.
Hence, credible challenges may come only from contracts intended to attract both types away for
the RSW allocation. As such, though, they must be strictly-profitable as pooling policies. Yet, by
hypothesis, there are no strictly-profitable pooling contracts that can attract the low-risk customers.
For if a1 ∈ R2+ is s.t. ΠM
(
a1
)
= ǫ > 0 and a1 %L a
∗∗
L , the contract a = a
1 − (1,−1) ǫ is such that
ΠM (a) = ΠM
(
a1
)
− ǫ = 0 and a ≻h a
1 by either h (it offers more income in either state of the
world). Yet, then we would have ΠM (a) = 0 and a ≻L a
∗∗
L which cannot be by hypothesis. 
C.2 The Hellwig Game
C.2.1 Deviations above FO∗M
We will show that the following is a sequential equilibrium scenario. Both the equilibrium and the
deviant policies get withdrawn at stage 3. Being then indifferent between applying for either policy,
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an agent of risk-type h applies for the former with probability
σh ∈ [0, 1) : 1 ≤
1− σL
1− σH
≤ λˆ∗ where λˆ∗ =
1− pˆ∗
pˆ∗
(59)
To support this, consider a sequence of trembles
{
qkL, q
k
H
}
k∈N
∈ (0, 1− σh)
2 such that
(
qkL, q
k
H
)
→
(0, 0). The intended interpretation is that, along the sequence, an agent of risk-type h applies for
the equilibrium and deviant contracts with probability σkh = σh+ q
k
h and 1− σ
k
h, respectively. This
is depicted in Figure 8 where the firm’s two available end-actions, to honor or withdraw its offer,
are given as NW and W, respectively, while its conditional belief as a deviant at the upper node of
its information set in by
λ(1−σkL)
λ(1−σkL)+(1−λ)(1−σ
k
H)
. Hence, throughout the deviant information set, the
average accident probability is pˆk =
λ(1−σkL)pL+(1−λ)(1−σ
k
H)pH
λ(1−σkL)+(1−λ)(1−σ
k
H)
. Equivalently,
1− pˆk
pˆk
=
λˆkλ (1− pL) + (1− λ) (1− pH)
λˆkλpL + (1− λ) pH
where λˆk =
1− σkL
1− σkH
(60)
But ddpˆk
(
1−pˆk
pˆk
)
< 0 < ∂
∂λˆk
(
1−pˆk
pˆk
)
∀pˆk, λˆk ∈ R++ while
1−pˆk
pˆk
= 1−p
p
for λˆk = 1. These expressions
apply also for pk, the average accident probability on the equilibrium information set, once λˆk is
replaced by λk = σ
k
L/σ
k
H .
W
1−s
NW
W
ED
NW
W
NW NW
W
1−s s
k
H
L
k k
L
s
H
k
H
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Figure 8: The Signalling Subgame
Let now qkL < q
k
H ∀k and observe that σ
k
L = σL + q
k
L < σL + q
k
H ≤ σH + q
k
H = σ
k
H , the second
inequality due to (59). That is, λk < 1 or pk > p along the sequence and, being on FO
∗
M , the
equilibrium contract is loss-making as a pooling poling and should get withdrawn at stage 3. If
it is the RS policy, on the other hand, it cannot but break even and we may actually impose its
withdrawal without loss of generality. Regarding the deviant policy, we have λˆ ≡ limk→∞ λˆk =
1−σL
1−σH
≤ λˆ∗. Equivalently, pˆ ≡ limk→∞ pˆk ≥ pˆ
∗ so that, taking a subsequence if necessary, this
policy will not make profits and should be withdrawn as well.
To complete the analysis, some additional observations are in order. It is immediate from the
above analysis that the scenario in question cannot be supported if the inequality (59) is violated.
For 1−σL1−σH < 1 and
1−σL
1−σH
> λˆ∗ require, respectively, that the equilibrium and the deviant contract
are honored at stage 3. It is equally immediate, however, that the scenario can be supported for
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σL = σH = 1. One needs only to define σ
k
h = 1 − r
k
h, for vanishing trembles
{
rkL, r
k
H
}
k∈N
∈ (0, 1)2
such that rkL > r
k
H ∀k.
Notice also that it is impossible to sustain a pooling equilibrium under a scenario in which
the deviant policy is not withdrawn at stage 3. For this to happen, the deviant policy must be
profitable. Being above FO∗M , though, the maximum average accident probability that allows it
to be profitable is pˆ∗ < p. Hence, the deviant is profitable only if λˆ∗ > 1. Equivalently, only if
λ ≡ limk→∞ λk < 1 or limk→∞ pk > p. Yet, the equilibrium contract is on FO
∗
M and this inequality
forces it to make losses as a pooling policy and precipitates its withdrawal at stage 3. Anticipating
this at stage 2, all agents cannot but apply for the deviant policy. But then, pˆ = p and the deviation
delivers losses.
Other sequential equilibria
It remains to consider the scenario in which the deviant policy is withdrawn at stage 3, the equi-
librium one is not, and it is strictly dominant for either risk-type to apply for the latter at stage 2
with probability one. As sequential equilibrium, this can be supported by a sequence of trembles{(
rkL, r
k
H
)}
k∈N
∈ (0, 1)2 such that
(
rkL, r
k
H
)
→ (0, 0) and rkL/r
k
H → 0. Along the sequence now, an
agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant contracts with probability 1 − rkh and
rkh, respectively, and the preceding formulae apply with σh = 1 and q
k
h = −r
k
h for either h. Hence,
λˆk = r
k
L/r
k
H → 0 and limk→∞
1−pˆk
pˆk
= 1−pH
pH
≤ 1−pˆ
∗
pˆ∗
, the equality by (60) while the inequality due
to the fact that ΠH (aˆ) ≤ 0 by (38) and, hence, pˆ
∗ ≤ pH . In other words, pˆ ≥ pˆ
∗ and, taking a
subsequence if necessary, the deviant policy is not expected to be profitable and will be withdrawn
at stage 3. Regarding the equilibrium policy, taking a further subsequence if necessary, λˆk < 1
necessitates that λk > 1 everywhere along the subsequence. Hence, limk→∞ pk ≥ p and the equi-
librium contract is expected to be profitable and be honored at stage 3. If it is the RS policy,
honoring it at stage 3 can be imposed without loss of generality.
C.2.2 Deviations on/below FO∗M
The argument of the preceding paragraph can be applied again to support the second sequential
equilibrium scenario. Notice, moreover, that there exist deviations below the line FO∗M against
which this is the only equilibrium. This follows immediately from two observations.
First, against a deviant contract aˆ that lies below FO∗M , no equilibrium scenario can have the
equilibrium policy withdrawn at stage 3. For, in this case, as long as the deviant suppliers honor
their policy, all agents of either risk-type cannot but apply for it at stage 2. Yet, the deviant
contract lying below FO∗M , it must be p < pˆ
∗ and, thus, ΠM (aˆ) > 0. If the entire population of
agents, therefore, applies for aˆ, the strategy of offering it at stage 1 and honoring it at stage 3 is
indeed a profitable deviation.
Second, there are contracts such as aˆ above which must be withdrawn at stage 3 in any sequential
equilibrium scenario. To see this, recall first that, being susceptible to deviations such as aˆ, the
equilibrium policy a∗ cannot be the Wilson one. Hence, we can always choose aˆ such that either
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(i) aˆ ≻h a
∗ for either risk-type h or (ii) aˆ ≻L a
∗ ≻H aˆ.
26 Suppose now that aˆ is honored at stage 3
on the equilibrium path. Anticipating this at stage 2, either (i) all agents of either risk-type or (ii)
only the low-risk ones would find it strictly-dominant to apply for aˆ. In each case, the beliefs of its
suppliers is such that pˆ ≤ p < pˆ∗. As before, the strategy of offering aˆ at stage 1 and honoring it
at stage 3 would be a profitable deviation.
When the equilibrium policy is the RS one, these arguments remain valid (recall the analysis in
Section 4). The claim becomes now that, under no equilibrium scenario, a∗L may be withdrawn at
stage 3. If it is, honoring their own policy becomes optimal for the deviant suppliers. And against
these strategies, the low-risk agents would find it optimal to apply for the deviant contract so that
again pˆ ≤ p < pˆ∗.
C.2.3 All equilibria, but the Wilson policy, are unstable
The equilibria in question are the RS policy and the contracts on FO∗M that Pareto-dominate it,
but for the Wilson one. All of them are subject to potentially-profitable deviations that lie below
FO∗M and do satisfy one of the cases (i)-(ii) in the preceding section. And against these deviations,
any sequential equilibrium requires that the deviant policy is withdrawn at stage 3, the equilibrium
one is not, and all agents apply at stage 2 for the latter with probability one. Moreover, this will
have to be supported by some vanishing sequence of trembles
{
rkL, r
k
H
}
k∈N
∈ (0, 1)2 along which an
agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant policies with probability σkh = 1 − r
k
h
and 1− σkh, respectively (Section C.2.1).
Consider now a perturbation {ǫh, r˜h}h=H,L ∈ (0, 1)
4. Under the equilibrium strategy profile in
question, an agent of risk-type h applies for the equilibrium and deviant contracts in the perturbed
game with probability σ˜kh = (1− ǫh)σ
k
h+ ǫhr˜h and 1− σ˜
k
h, respectively. To support this also on the
perturbed game, the deviant contract has to be withdrawn at stage 3 at least in the limit.
As rkH → 0, however, ∃ (n, k
′′
n) ∈ N
2 \ {(0, 0)} : rkH < [4n (1− ǫH)]
−1 ∀k > k′′n. Letting,
therefore, k∗ = max {k′, k′′} while choosing n ∈ (1,∞) sufficiently large, ǫL (1− r˜L) = λˆ
∗/n, and
ǫH (1− r˜H) = (4n)
−1, we get
1− σ˜kH ≡ (1− ǫH) r
k
H + ǫH (1− r˜H) <
1
4n
+
1
4n
=
1
2n
=
ǫL (1− r˜L)
2λˆ∗
<
(1− ǫL) r
k
L + ǫL (1− r˜L)
2λˆ∗
=
1− σ˜kL
2λˆ∗
∀k > k∗
That is, limk→∞ λˆk ≥ 2λˆ
∗ > λˆ∗ or pˆ < pˆ∗. Hence, the deviant policy is believed to be profit-making
and will not be withdrawn at stage 3, a contradiction of the desired sequential equilibrium scenario.
To complete the argument, observe that the sequence of trembles we considered was arbitrary. It
follows, therefore, that the desired scenario cannot be supported as sequential equilibrium. Notice
26Examples of aˆ were constructed in Section 1. Graphically, case (i) is depicted by points in the interiors of the
shaded area in the right-hand side diagram of Figure 1 or of the upper-left shaded area in the right-hand side of
Figure 2. Case (ii) corresponds to points in the interior of the shaded area in the left-hand side of Figure 1 that lies
below the line FO∗M .
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also that, being free to choose the randomized profile {r˜L, r˜H} arbitrarily, our construction allows
the mixture {ǫL, ǫH} to be arbitrarily close to the original game.
C.2.4 The Wilson policy is stable
Against the Wilson policy, a potentially-profitable deviation cannot but lie above the line FO∗M .
And against this, the sequential equilibrium scenario has both contracts withdrawn at stage 3.
Being then indifferent between applying for either policy, an agent of risk-type h applies for the
Wilson contract with probability σh ∈ [0, 1) such that (59) is satisfied. We will show that this
scenario can be supported also under perturbations as long as we restrict (59) to
1 <
1− σL
1− σH
<
1 + λˆ∗
2
(61)
Consider the sequence of trembles
{
qkL, q
k
H
}
k∈N
∈ (0, 1− σL)× (0, 1− σH), with limk→∞
(
qkL, q
k
H
)
=
(0, 0) and qkH > q
k
L for all k, along which an agent of risk-type h applies for the Wilson and the
deviant contracts with probability σkh = σh+q
k
h and 1−σ
k
h, respectively. It suffices to establish that
such trembles continue to support the given scenario even when the game undergoes an arbitrary
perturbation. To this end, consider a randomized profile (q˜L, q˜H) ∈ (0, 1)
2 and the perturbation that
arises under this profile and a mixture (ǫL, ǫH) ∈ (0, ǫ)
2 with ǫ < min
{
σH−σL
2+σH
, 1− σH −
1+σH−2σL
λˆ∗
}
.
Under this perturbation, and along the given sequence of trembles, an agent of risk-type h applies
for the Wilson and the deviant contract with probability σ˜kh = (1− ǫh)σ
k
h + ǫhq˜h and 1 − σ˜
k
h,
respectively.
To replicate the sequential equilibrium argument, it is enough that the two required conditions,
for the Wilson and the deviant contract to be both withdrawn, are met. The former requirement
is indeed satisfied since
σ˜kH = (1− ǫH)
(
σH + q
k
H
)
+ ǫH q˜H > (1− ǫ)
(
σH + q
k
H
)
+ ǫH q˜H
> (1− ǫ)
(
σH + q
k
H
)
> σL + q
k
L + ǫ
> (1− ǫL)
(
σL + q
k
L
)
+ ǫq˜L > (1− ǫL)
(
σL + q
k
L
)
+ ǫLq˜L = σ˜
k
L
Here, the first and last inequalities follow from the fact that ǫL, ǫH < ǫ whereas the second and the
one before the last inequality use the boundedness conditions ǫH q˜H > 0 and q˜L < 1, respectively.
The remaining inequality uses the first upper bound of ǫ. Specifically, as qkL < q
k
H < 1, we have
ǫ < σH−σL2+σH <
σH−σL
1+σH+q
k
H
<
σH+q
k
H
−(σL+qkL)
1+σH+q
k
H
.
It remains to verify that the other required condition, for the deviant contract to be withdrawn,
is also met. To this end, observe that, given our assumptions, we have
ǫL
(
σkL − q˜L
)
= ǫL
(
σL + q
k
L − q˜L
)
< ǫL
(
σL + q
k
L
)
< ǫ
(
σL + q
k
L
)
< ǫ
(
σH + q
k
H
)
= ǫσkH
< ǫ
(
1 + σkH
)
< σkH − σ
k
L (62)
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where the third inequality uses that σH > σL - by the left-hand side of (61) - and q
k
H > q
k
L while the
last inequality follows from ǫ <
σk
H
−σk
L
1+σk
H
(as established at the very end of the preceding paragraph).
In addition,
1− σkH + ǫH
(
σkH − q˜H
)
> 1− σkH − ǫH q˜H > 1− σ
k
H − ǫq˜H > 1− σ
k
H − ǫ (63)
the first two inequalities following from ǫHsH > 0 and ǫH < ǫ, respectively, while the last one using
the fact that q˜H < 1. Regarding the last quantity above, moreover, we have
1− σkH − ǫ = 1−
(
σH + q
k
H
)
− ǫ > 1− σH −
1− σL
λˆ∗
− ǫ > 1− σH −
1 + σH − 2σL
λˆ∗
− ǫ > 0 (64)
Here, the first inequality obtains because, choosing a subsequence of
{
qkH
}
k∈N
if necessary, we can
guarantee that qkH <
1−σL
λˆ∗
for all k. The second inequality, on the other hand, follows from σH > σL
while the last one uses the second upper bound of ǫ. Putting now the results (62)-(64) together,
we get
1− σ˜kL
1− σ˜kH
=
1− σkL + ǫL
(
σkL − q˜L
)
1− σkH + ǫH
(
σkH − q˜H
) < 1 + σkH − 2σkL
1− σkH − ǫ
For the deviant contract to be withdrawn, it suffices that the last ratio above doesn’t exceed λˆ⋆.
Which is indeed the case, at least along a subsequence of
{
qkL, q
k
H
}
k∈N
, since
lim
k→∞
1 + σkH − 2σ
k
L
1− σkH − ǫ
=
1 + σH − 2σL
1− σH − ǫ
< λˆ∗
by the second upper bound of ǫ. Observe finally that, as λˆ∗ > 1, (61) is indeed a restriction of
(59). Moreover, either upper bound of ǫ is well-defined: they are both positive since σH > σL while
1 + σH − 2σL < λˆ
∗ (1− σH) is in fact the right-hand side of (61). 
The unstable parts
Let now 1−σL1−σH ∈
(
1+λˆ∗
2 , λˆ
∗
]
. In this case, 1−σL1−σH =
1+λˆ∗+δ
2 for some δ ∈
(
0, λˆ
∗−1
2
]
, and we may
consider the trembles q˜L = σH , q˜H =
1
q
[(1 + q)σH − σL] for some q ∈
(
σH−σL
1−σH
,+∞
)
, and the
mixtures ǫL = 1/n and ǫH = q/n
2 for some n ∈ R++.
27 Then,
ǫL (σL − q˜L)− λˆ
∗ǫH (σH − q˜H) =
(
λˆ∗
n2
−
1
n
)
(σH − σL)
> σH − σL =
(
λˆ∗ + δ
)
(1− σH)− (1− σL)
where the second equality is just another way of writing our initial condition while the inequality
is due to the fact that λˆ∗ > 1 and, thus, λˆ∗ > n+1
n
as long as n is taken to be sufficiently large.
Under this perturbation, therefore,
lim
k→∞
1− σ˜kL
1− σ˜kH
=
1− σL + ǫL (σL − q˜L)
1− σH + ǫH (σH − q˜H)
> λˆ∗ +
δ (1− σH)
1− σH + ǫH (σH − q˜H)
> λˆ∗
27Here, the lower bound on q is introduced to ensure that q˜H < 1.
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which is the desired contradiction: at least along a subsequence, the deviant policy is believed to
be strictly profitable and will not be withdrawn at stage 3.
With respect to the second equilibrium scenario given in Section C.2.1, recall that it had the
deviant policy withdrawn at stage 3, the equilibrium policy honored, and all agents apply at stage
2 for the latter with probability one. We have already established, though, in Section C.2.3 that
this is not stable. That argument applies also for the case in which the first scenario above obtains
with either risk-type applying for the Wilson contract with probability one.
D Equilibrium with cross-subsidization
Proof of Proposition 5
It will be instructive to distinguish the case µ ∈ [0, λ) from the one in which µ ∈ [λ, 1).
Case I. µ ∈ [λ, 1)
Since µ < 1, let
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
be the IIE(µ) optimum for some µ0 ∈ (µ, 1] and observe the following
1. UL
(
w0L
)
> UL (w
∗
L) but UH
(
w0H
)
< UH (w
∗
H).
This is because, the mapping from the parameter µ to the IIE optimum being bijective (Claim
1), the strict version of Lemma 6 applies; hence, moving to the new allocation must be strictly
beneficial [resp. detrimental] for the low-risk [resp. high-risk] type given that µ0 > µ.
2. UL
(
w0L
)
> UL
(
w0H
)
while UH
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0H
)
and UL (w
∗
L) ≥ UL (w
∗
H) while UH (w
∗
L) =
UH (w
∗
H).
This is due to either allocation being IIE with the respective parameters satisfying µ0 > λ and
µ ≥ λ (Claim 1).
3. a0L = a
∗
L − (ǫ0L, ǫ1L) and a
0
H = a
∗
H − (−1, 1) ǫH for some (ǫ0L, ǫ1L, ǫH) ∈ R× R× R++.
For the first part, just let ǫsL = a
∗
sL − a
0
sL for s = 0, 1 and observe that, the corresponding wealth
allocation being w0L = (w
∗
0L + ǫ0L, w
∗
1L − ǫ1L), the only restriction UL
(
w0L
)
> UL (w
∗
L) imposes
is that it cannot be (ǫ0L,−ǫ1L) ≤ 0. Regarding the second part of the present observation, for
the same reason which supports the preceding observation, the high-risk agents ought to be fully-
insured in either allocation. That is, it must be w00H = w
0
1H and w
∗
0H = w
∗
1H , or a
∗
0H = d − a
∗
1H
and a00H = d − a
0
1H for the corresponding contracts. Yet, the last two equations are equivalent to
a0H = a
∗
H − (−1, 1) ǫH for some ǫH ∈ R. And since a
0
H 6= a
∗
H , it cannot but be ǫH 6= 0. In fact, it
must be ǫH > 0. For if ǫH < 0, we may write a
0
H = a
∗
H + (−1, 1) |ǫH | and appeal to Lemma 2 for
some ǫ˜H ∈ (0, |ǫH |) such that
UH
(
w0H
)
− UH (w
∗
H) =
[
pHu
′ (w∗1H + ǫ˜H) + (1− pH)u
′ (w∗0H + ǫ˜H)
]
|ǫH |
= u′ (w∗0H + ǫ˜H) |ǫH | > 0
an absurd conclusion, however, in light of observation I.
4. λ [(1− pL) ǫ0L − pLǫ1L] = (1− λ) ǫH
This follow immediately from the preceding observation and the fact that, either allocation being
IIE, it must be λΠL (a
∗
L)+(1− λ)ΠH (a
∗
H) = 0 = λΠL
(
a0L
)
+(1− λ)ΠH
(
a0H
)
. Intuitively, moving
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from the original to new allocation, the gain by making smaller losses from the high-risk type should
be exactly offset by the fall in the profit collected from the low-risk one.
5. UL
(
w0H
)
< UL (w
∗
H).
This is because, since a∗H = a
0
H + (−1, 1) ǫH with ǫH > 0, Lemma 2 guarantees the existence of
some ǫ˜L ∈ (0, ǫH) such that
UL (w
∗
H)− UL
(
w0H
)
=
[
pLu
′
(
w01H + ǫ˜L
)
+ (1− pL)u
′
(
w00H + ǫ˜L
)]
ǫH
= u′
(
w00H + ǫ˜L
)
ǫH > 0
Putting now our observations together, there exists a menu
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
, given by a0L = a
∗
L−(ǫ0L, ǫ1L)
and a0H = a
∗
H − (−1, 1) ǫH for some (ǫ0L, ǫ1L, ǫH) ∈ R × R × R++ with (ǫ0L, ǫ1L) ≤ 0 ruled out,
which is IIE(µ0) optimal for some µ0 ∈ (µ, 1] and satisfies
UL
(
w0H
)
< UL (w
∗
H) ≤ UL (w
∗
L) < UL
(
w0L
)
UH
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0H
)
< UH (w
∗
H)
λ [(1− pL) ǫ0L − pLǫ1L] = (1− λ) ǫH
Let now ∆ = UL
(
w0L
)
− UL (w
∗
L) and consider the contract aˆL = a
0
L + (1, κ) ǫ for some κ ∈(
0, IH
(
a0L
))
and ǫ > 0. Let also ∆h = Ih
(
a0L
)
− κ for h = L,H. Using Lemma 2 once again, the
corresponding wealth allocations give
Uh (wˆL)− Uh
(
w0L
)
=
[
phu
′
(
w01L + ǫˆh
)
− κ−1 (1− ph)u
′
(
w00L − κ
−1ǫˆh
)]
κǫ
=
[
κ−
(1− ph)u
′
(
w00L − κ
−1ǫˆh
)
phu′
(
w01L + ǫˆh
) ] phu′ (w01L + ǫˆh) ǫ
=
[
κ− Ih
(
a0L +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01L + ǫˆh
)
ǫ
=
[
Ih
(
a0L
)
−∆h − Ih
(
a0L −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01L + ǫˆh
)
ǫ
for some ǫˆh ∈ (0, κǫ). Yet, the function Ih (·) is continuous and limǫˆh→0 Ih
(
a0L +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
=
Ih
(
a0L
)
. For small enough ǫ (and, subsequently, ǫˆh), therefore, |Ih
(
a0L +
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
− Ih
(
a0L
)
| <
min {∆L,∆H} and, consequently, Uh (wˆL) < Uh
(
w0L
)
for either h. With respect to the low-risk
type, however, observe that the last quantity above vanishes as ǫ→ 0. Consequently, for sufficiently
small ǫ, we can guarantee that UL (wˆL) − UL
(
w0L
)
∈ (−∆, 0) or UL (wˆL) > UL (w
∗
L). But then,
we have UL (wL) > UL (w
∗
L) > UL (w
∗
H) > UL
(
w0H
)
and UH (wL) < UH
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0H
)
<
UH (w
∗
H).
Setting, thus, {aˆL, aˆH} = {aˆL,a
∗
H} establishes parts (i) and (iii) of the lemma for the case in which
µ ∈ [λ, 1). It remains to show that the latter menu is expected to be strictly profitable when
accepted by both types. To this end, notice that, compared to
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
which is IIE and, thus,
breaks even across the two-types, the new menu makes exactly the same expected loss from the
high-risk agents. It expects, however, more profits from the low-risk since
ΠL (aˆL)−ΠL
(
a0L
)
=
(
1− pL
pL
− κ
)
pLǫ >
[
1− pL
pL
− IL
(
a0L
)]
pLǫ
= (1− pL)
[
1−
u′
(
w00L
)
u′
(
w01L
)] ǫ > 0
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Here, the first inequality is since κ < IH
(
a0L
)
< IL
(
a0L
)
. The second inequality follows from
risk-aversion and the fact that, the allocation
{
w0L,w
0
H
}
being IIE(µ0) with µ0 > λ, it must give
w00L > w
0
1L (Claim 1).
Case II. µ ∈ [0, λ)
Letting now
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
be the IIE(µ0) optimum for some µ0 ∈ (µ, λ], it is trivial to adopt the
steps of reasoning we followed in the previous case to conclude now that a0L = a
∗
L + (−1, 1) ǫL and
a0H = a
∗
H − (ǫ0H , ǫ1H) with ǫL > 0 and ǫ0H , ǫ1H ∈ R but (ǫ0H ,−ǫ1H) ≥ 0 not possible. Moreover,
the corresponding wealth allocations w0L = w
∗
L + (1,−1) ǫL and w
0
H = w
∗
H + (ǫ0H ,−ǫ1H) give now
UL (w
∗
L) < UL
(
w0L
)
= UL
(
w0H
)
UH
(
w0L
)
< UH
(
w0H
)
< UH (w
∗
H)
λǫL = (1− λ) [(1− pH) ǫ0H − pHǫ1H ]
Here, UL
(
w0H
)
= UL
(
w0L
)
and UH
(
w0H
)
> UH
(
w0L
)
are because of IIE(µ0) optimality with µ0 < λ
(Claim 1) while UL
(
w0L
)
> UL (w
∗
L) and UH
(
w0H
)
< UH (w
∗
H) are by construction.
Let now ∆ = UH
(
w0H
)
− UH
(
w0L
)
and consider the contract aH = a
0
H − (1, κ) ǫ for some κ ∈(
IL
(
a0H
)
,+∞
)
and ǫ > 0. Let also ∆h = κ− Ih
(
a0H
)
for h = L,H. By Lemma 2 again, it must be
Uh
(
w0H
)
− Uh (wH) =
[
phu
′
(
w01H − ǫˆh
)
− κ−1 (1− ph)u
′
(
w00H + κ
−1ǫˆh
)]
κǫ
=
[
κ− Ih
(
a0H −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01H − ǫˆh
)
ǫ
=
[
Ih
(
a0H
)
+∆h − Ih
(
a0H −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)]
phu
′
(
w01H − ǫˆh
)
ǫ > 0
for some ǫˆh ∈ (0, κǫ) and sufficiently small ǫ to ensure that |Ih
(
a0H −
(
κ−1, 1
)
ǫˆh
)
− Ih
(
a0H
)
| <
min {∆L,∆H} for either h. Regarding the high-risk type, though, observe that, for sufficiently small
ǫ, we can also guarantee that UH (wH)−UH
(
w0H
)
∈ (−∆, 0); consequently, UH (wH) > UH
(
w0L
)
.
Clearly, UL
(
w0L
)
= UL
(
w0H
)
> UL (wH) , UL (w
∗
L) and UH
(
w0L
)
< UH (wH) < UH
(
w0H
)
<
UH (w
∗
H). Setting, thus, {aˆL, aˆH} =
{
a0L, aˆH
}
establishes parts (i) and (iii) of the lemma in this
case. Part (ii), on the other hand, follows from the fact the menu in question makes exactly the
same expected profit as the IIE menu
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
from the low-risk agents but smaller losses from
the high-risk. Indeed,
ΠH (aˆH)−ΠH
(
a0H
)
=
(
κ−
1− pH
pH
)
pHǫ >
(
IH
(
a0H
)
−
1− pH
pH
)
pHǫ
= (1− pH)
[
u′
(
w00H
)
u′
(
w01H
) − 1] ǫ > 0
where the first inequality follows from the choice of κ whereas the last one obtains because the
allocation
{
w0L,w
0
H
}
, being IIE(µ0) with µ0 < λ, over-insures the high-risk agents (Claim 1). 
Proof of Proposition 6
In what follows, let
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
denote the IIE(1) optimum with
{
w1L,w
1
H
}
the corresponding wealth
allocation. Being feasible, the menu {a∗L,a
∗
H} satisfies the constraints of the IIE(1) problem. For
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the corresponding wealth allocation, therefore, we ought to have: UL
(
w1L
)
> UL (w
∗
L). Given this,
we may proceed as in the µ ∈ [λ, 1) case in the proof of Lemma 5, albeit with
{
a1L,a
1
H
}
as our
starting menu.
Reasoning in the same way as there, it is trivial to verify that, for small enough ǫH > 0, there exists
a menu
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
, defined by a0H = a
1
H − (1,−1) ǫH and a
0
L = a
1
L + (ǫ0L, ǫ1L) with ǫ0L, ǫ1L ∈ R but
(ǫ0L,−ǫ1L) ≤ 0 not possible, which is optimal for the IIE(µ
0) problem for some µ0 ∈ (λ, 1) and
whose wealth allocation, w0L =
(
w10L − ǫ0L, w
1
1L + ǫ1L
)
and w0H = w
1
H + (1, 1) ǫH , satisfies
UL
(
w0H
)
< UL
(
w0L
)
< UL
(
w1L
)
UL (w
∗
H) ≤ UL (w
∗
L) < UL
(
w0L
)
UH
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0H
)
λ [(1− pL) ǫ0L − pLǫ1L] = (1− λ) ǫH
Regarding these relations, µ0 > λ is ensured by the continuity of the IIE problem in the parameter
µ: we can choose µ0 to be arbitrarily close to 1 so as to guarantee that 1 − µ0 < 1 − λ. Given
µ0 > λ then, the incentive constraint of the low-risk [resp. high-risk] type does not [resp.does] bind
at the optimum. That is, UL
(
w0H
)
< UL
(
w0L
)
and UH
(
w0H
)
= UH
(
w0L
)
. The remaining relations
are by construction or immediate, apart from UL (w
∗
L) < UL
(
w0L
)
.
To verify the latter, let ∆1 = UL
(
w1L
)
− UL (w
∗
L) and notice that, as a mapping V : [0, 1] 7→ R,
the value function of the IIE(µ) problem is convex on [0, 1] (Lemma 3), and, thus, continuous at
any µ ∈ (0, 1) by a well-known result (see, for instance, Ch.6 Th. 2.14 in [7]). Observe also that,
since µ0 > λ, it must be UL
(
w0L
)
6= UH
(
w0H
)
. Otherwise, we would have UL
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0H
)
=
UH
(
w0L
)
and UL
(
w0L
)
= UH
(
w0L
)
cannot be unless w0L provides full insurance, which is absurd
since µ0 6= λ. Given these two observations, taking µ0 sufficiently close to 1 guarantees that
max
{(
1− µ0
) ∣∣UL (w0L)− UH (w0H)∣∣ , ∣∣V (1)− V (µ0)∣∣} < ∆1/2
But then we have indeed
UL
(
w0L
)
> µ0UL
(
w0L
)
+
(
1− µ0
)
UH
(
w0H
)
−
∆1
2
= V
(
µ0
)
−
∆1
2
> V (1)−∆1 = UL
(
w1L
)
−∆1 = UL (w
∗
L)
Define now ∆ = UL
(
w0L
)
− max
{
UL
(
w0H
)
, UL (w
∗
L)
}
and proceed to construct the contract aˆL
exactly as in the µ ∈ [λ, 1) case in the proof of Lemma 5. Here, UL (wˆL) − UL
(
w0L
)
∈ (−∆, 0)
implies that UL (aˆL) > max
{
UL
(
w0H
)
, UL (w
∗
L)
}
. Setting {aˆL, aˆH} =
{
aˆL,a
0
H
}
gives a separating
menu (aˆL ≻L a
0
H ∼H a
0
L ≻H aˆL) such that aˆL ≻L a
∗
L. Moreover, compared to
{
a0L,a
0
H
}
which is
IIE and, thus, breaks even across the two-types, the new menu expects exactly the same loss from
the high-risk agents but more profit from the low-risk ones. 
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